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The Edges are Bleeding: Constitutional 
Proxies and Imprisoned Trans Bodies in 
Edmo and Gibson 
Jen L. Davison† 
 
No one ever thinks of us as human 
because we are more ghost than flesh, 
because people fear that my gender expression is a trick, 
that it exists to be perverse, 
that it ensnares them without their consent, 
that my body is a feast for their eyes and hands 
and once they have fed off my queer, 
they’ll regurgitate all the parts they did not like. 
They’ll put me back into the closet, hang me with all the other 
skeletons. 
I will be the best attraction. 
Can you see how easy it is to talk people into coffins, 
to misspell their names on gravestones.1 
 
The human body historically has been conferred certain rights 
in law. For centuries, rights, privilege, and status could accrue 
only to male bodies (in some cases in British, European, and 
American societies, only to Caucasian, light-skinned, male 
bodies.) Women and other non-white men were chattels, 
servants, or little more than beasts of burden, and were 
frequently regarded as lacking the capacity to reason, even 
lacking souls. Particular qualities: autonomy, authenticity, 
authority, dignity—and rights: privacy, freedom, and equality—
attach to, or conversely are denied, a corporeal presence.2 
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 1. Lee Mokobe, A Powerful Poem About What It Feels to Be Transgender, Fine 
Acts Collective, https://fineacts.co/lee-mokobe [https://perma.cc/CXR2-CTX7]. 
 2. Jamison Green, “If I Follow the Rules, Will You Make Me a Man?” Patterns 
in Transsexual Validation, 34 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 23, 24 (2012) (citation omitted). 
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We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness.3 
 
The endowment of certain unalienable rights for certain bodies 
was declared obvious by the Founding Fathers of the United States. 
More than 200 years later, the category of “men” whose rights were 
presumed has produced a long-fought war waged at battlefronts 
including slavery’s abolition, women’s liberation, and a front at 
hand—transgender rights.4 The 1960s second-wave feminist 
movement and the 1970s intersex and transgender movements 
argued that identity and gender were social constructs, challenging 
“the essentialist biologically based conceptualization of gender” 
rigidly curtailing some bodies’ rights.5 Nevertheless, American 
culture widely continued to view gender-nonconformism as a 
disorder, where only biologically-derived gender identities were 
normatively correct.6 The dissonance of these norms with the 
 
 3. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 4. See ANNE-MARIE CUSAC, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE CULTURE OF 
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 120 (2009) (observing second-wave feminism, gay 
liberation, and Black power caused increasing anxiety for cultural conservatives); 
see also Kevin M. Barry, Brian Farrell, Jennifer L. Levi & Neelima Vanguri, A Bare 
Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
507, 508 (2016) (noting the torch has been passed from LGB to T recently and the 
next civil rights frontier belongs to transgender people). 
 5. Mairéad Losty & John O’Connor, Falling Outside of the ‘Nice Little Binary 
Box’: A Psychoanalytic Exploration of the Non-binary Gender Identity, 32 
PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 40, 41 (2018). The World Health Organization 
currently observes the social construction of gender as a known fact: 
Gender, typically described in terms of masculinity and femininity, is a 
social construction that varies across different cultures and over time. There 
are a number of cultures, for example, in which greater gender diversity 
exists and sex and gender are not always neatly divided along binary lines 
such as male and female or homosexual and heterosexual. The Berdache in 
North America, the fa’afafine (Samoan for “the way of a woman”) in the 
Pacific, and the kathoey in Thailand are all examples of different gender 
categories that differ from the traditional Western division of people into 
males and females. Further, among certain North American native 
communities, gender is seen more in terms of a continuum than categories, 
with special acknowledgement of “two-spirited” people who encompass both 
masculine and feminine qualities and characteristics. It is apparent, then, 
that different cultures have taken different approaches to creating gender 
distinctions, with more or less recognition of [the] fluidity and complexity of 
gender. 
Genomic Resource Centre Gender and Genetics: Genetic Components of Sex and 
Gender, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/genomics/gender/en/ 
index1.html [https://perma.cc/M98M-NB73]. 
 6. Losty, supra note 5, at 41 (noting this is still the case in particular for non-
binary individuals where “legitimate” trans-persons are trans-men or trans-women); 
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American ideals of equality and independence lingers, but recently 
there have been some dissonance-reducing gains for some 
Americans whose rights the Constitution has historically failed to 
protect.7 
If we take the Founding Fathers at their aspirational word, 
the Constitution’s protections are for every American, regardless of 
their body.8 Constitutional protections are big ideas actualized by 
proxies. A proxy is “the agency, function, or office of a deputy who 
acts as a substitute for another.”9 Like representational signifiers 
for reality that gesture towards what is real, proxies are stand-ins 
for larger values that can be hard to realize in everyday life—
particularly when their course flows through the rapids of 
normative social change. The law, its interpreters, and every 
doctrine and test they employ are such proxies. 
Among such rapids of normative change, for decades courts 
have been considering whether the treatment of transgender10 
 
see also Elvira Prusaczyk & Gordon Hodson, The Roles of Political Conservatism and 
Binary Gender Beliefs in Predicting Prejudices Toward Gay Men and People Who Are 
Transgender, SEX ROLES 1, 2 (2019) (arguing that according to social dominance 
theory, societies are organized into hierarchical groups maintained through the 
legitimizing myths of rightly-apportioned power in hierarchy-enhancing ideologies—
which for Americans have been right-leaning ideologies that justify and rationalize 
prejudice and discrimination against non-Anglo, non-hetero, non-male bodies). 
Prusaczyk & Hodson further observe that “[r]esearch shows that those on the 
political right tend to express more negativity toward LGBTQ+ people” driven by an 
epistemic need to protect their ideology through “resistance to change and opposition 
to equality.” Id. 
 7. Gay marriage rights, for example, were recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 646 (2015). The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Edmo 
v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), is another such 
example—and is a focus of this Note. 
 8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 3. 
 9. Proxy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
proxy [https://perma.cc/ALP7-MBRT]. 
 10. See Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 15, 15–16 n.2 (2003). Recognizing words and naming have power as 
Spade suggests, this Note will use the terms “transgender” and “trans” as umbrella 
terms for people who “transgress the rules of binary gender.” See Scott R. Chaiet, 
MD, MBA; Shane D. Morrison, MD, MS; Carl G. Streed, Jr., MD, Gender 
Confirmation Surgery and Terminology in Transgender Health, 152 JAMA SURGERY 
1089, 1089 (2017). Accordingly, this Note will not use “transsexual,” typically the 
medicalized term used to describe a subcategory among transgender people 
experiencing acute gender dysphoria often treated with hormones and surgery, 
because this term is outdated, stigma-reinforcing, and in the process of being retired 
by many national and international organizations. See Jens U. Berli, Gail Knudson, 
Lin Fraser, Vin Tangpricha, Randi Ettner, Frederic M. Ettner, Joshua D. Safer, Julie 
Graham, Stan Monstrey & Loren Schechter, What Surgeons Need to Know About 
Gender Confirmation Surgery When Providing Care for Transgender Individuals: A 
Review, 152 JAMA SURGERY 394, 394 (2017) (putting some numbers to the 
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imprisoned persons experiencing gender dysphoria (GD),11 
including through gender confirmation surgery (GCS),12 falls 
within—or expands the definition of—medical necessity, activating 
Eighth Amendment protections against a deliberately indifferent 
government.13 This debate came to a head in 2019 when two federal 
circuit courts came to opposite conclusions on two cases of 
imprisoned persons experiencing severe GD. In Gibson v. Collier, 
the Fifth Circuit held that it was not cruel and unusual punishment 
for the State to deny GCS to an incarcerated individual named 
 
population on which this Note will focus, approximately 0.4% to 1.3% of the 
population worldwide experiences gender dysphoria (GD)); see also Cynthia S. 
Osborne & Anne A. Lawrence, Male Prison Inmates With Gender Dysphoria: When 
Is Sex Reassignment Surgery Appropriate?, 45 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV., 1649, 1649 
(2016) (noting in Western countries, it is estimated that male-to-female (MtF) 
transgenderism is present in about 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 12,000, but research suggests 
a higher prevalence among male imprisoned persons in the U.S.); Yvette K. W. 
Bourcicot & Daniel Hirotsu Woofter, Prudent Policy: Accommodating Prisoners with 
Gender Dysphoria, 12 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 283, 286 (2016) (estimating the 
transgender population in the U.S. to be approximately 700,000 individuals, with 
16% reporting being imprisoned at some point). But c.f. Osborne, supra, at 1650 
(observing firsthand a prevalence of about 1 in 500 male imprisoned persons 
identifying as transgender, estimating that “there could easily be 3000–4000 males 
with GD in U.S. prisons”); Erin McCauley, Kristen Eckstrand, Bethlehem Desta, Ben 
Bouvier, Brad Brockmann & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Exploring Healthcare 
Experiences for Incarcerated Individuals Who Identify as Transgender in a Southern 
Jail, 3 TRANSGENDER HEALTH 34, 34 (2018) (“One in six transgender individuals 
have been incarcerated at some point in their lives. For [B]lack transgender people, 
the rates of incarceration are even higher; some estimates indicate that nearly half 
(47%) have been incarcerated at some point.”). 
 11. See THE DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 451 
(Am. Psychiatric Ass’n ed., 5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V] (explaining GD “refers 
to the distress that may accompany the incongruence between one’s experienced or 
expressed gender and one’s assigned gender”); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
GENDER DYSPHORIA (2013), https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/ 
Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf (clarifying why the 
DSM-V replaced the category “gender identity disorder” in previous editions with 
“gender dysphoria” to officially recognize that gender nonconformity is not a mental 
disorder). 
 12. See Osborne, supra note 10, at 1650 (Gender Confirmation Surgery (GCS), 
also known as Gender Reassignment Surgery (GRS), Gender Reaffirming Surgery 
(GRS), Sex Confirmation Surgery (SCS), Sex Reassignment Surgery (SRS), a Sex 
Change Operation, Sexual Reassignment Surgery (SRS), or Bottom Surgery, 
encompasses surgical procedures performed to align an individual’s primary and 
secondary sex characteristics aesthetically and/or functionally to resemble those of 
their gender identity). For a better understanding of surgical measures that may be 
taken—and how binary their conceptualization is in the medical field, see Berli et 
al., supra note 10, at 398. For an overview of related terminology, see generally Lee 
Harrington, Traversing Gender: Understanding Transgender Realities (2016) 
(ebook). 
 13. See Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164 (2015); De’lonta v. Johnson, 
708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011); Maggert 
v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th 
Cir. 1987). 
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Vanessa Lynn Gibson.14 In Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
held that GCS was medically necessary for an incarcerated 
individual named Adree Edmo and that responsible prison 
authorities were deliberately indifferent to this need in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment.15 
This Note will explore this circuit rift and the arguments 
mobilized for and against locating GCS under Eighth Amendment 
protections. Part I will provide an overview of GD and GCS, a brief 
history of the principle of medical necessity and the Eighth 
Amendment, and a review of the Gibson and Edmo decisions. Part 
II will argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision to treat GCS as a 
medical necessity for Edmo, while problematic, is part of an 
objectively and normatively right progression that can and should 
be adopted by other circuits and the Supreme Court. Finally, Part 
III will explore what the Edmo and Gibson decisions are telling us 
about the American conscience, the dissonance between our Eighth 
Amendment ideals and the medical necessity proxy we use to 
actualize them, and the resulting need to elevate prison practices 
that induce self-harm or suicidality to proxies in their own right. 
Using medical necessity as a proxy for our Eighth Amendment 
consciences is producing mixed results that allow American citizens 
and legal professionals to tolerate cruel and unusual punishments. 
I. Background for the Edmo and Gibson Decisions 
In order to contextualize the Edmo and Gibson cases, this first 
Part will provide a brief historical context for these decisions, an 
overview of the GD both Edmo and Gibson experienced, and a 
description of the GCS they hoped to be evaluated for and/or receive. 
Since GD and GCS are medical in nature, they fall under the 
medical necessity doctrine as a proxy for Eighth Amendment 
protections, which will also be discussed here. This Part will then 
conclude with review of how each court applied the medical 
necessity doctrine to Edmo and Gibson. 
A. The Historical Context for Court-Ordered Gender 
Confirmation Surgery 
The Eighth Amendment, ratified in 1791, reads: “Excessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
 
 14. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 15. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). 
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unusual punishments inflicted.”16 It is understood to forbid 
practices contrary to eighteenth-century notions of civilized 
behavior through to today’s contemporary social mores.17 
Unfortunately, there is no one place we assemble our norms and 
then systematically realign our behaviors and institutions in society 
to match them. Even if there were, knowing the norms is not 
enough; you must also be aware of current practices to locate 
misalignments. When it comes to the criminal justice system, 
imprisoned persons and the punitive pains they suffer have become 
largely hidden from ordinary citizens who do not “recognize convicts 
as fully our own nor see the centrality of pain to our culture.”18 This 
makes court cases an important window into the hidden 
experiences of incarcerated Americans with the potential to expose 
equally hidden dissonances with our prevailing norms. 
It was not until 1976 that the Supreme Court considered the 
Eighth Amendment’s protections for incarcerated individuals.19 In 
Estelle v. Gamble, the Court agreed that one key measure of such 
punishment is in the deprivation of medical care for a “serious 
 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Imprisoned persons who seek to challenge prison 
officials’ decisions impacting their constitutional rights may bring either a § 1983 or 
a Bivens action, depending upon whether the official is a state or federal employee, 
and may then seek damages and injunctive relief as per 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 
states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress . . . [,]  
or as per Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 395–96 (1971) (recognizing a similar cause of action to § 1983 and allowing 
claims against federal actors). 
 17. MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 84–85 (5th ed. 2017) (discussing 
the history of what is objectively cruel and unusual punishment). 
 18. CUSAC, supra note 4, at 13; see also Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison 
Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 972 (2009) 
(“Banished into nonexistence, prisoners are noticed, if at all, only at the moment of 
sentencing or upon release, or when through an escape or some other notorious act 
they force themselves upon the public consciousness. But if the public benefits from 
this (temporary) freedom from the company of those deemed unfit to live in society, 
it does so only because the state commits to providing for the ongoing care and 
protection of the people society wishes to exclude during their incarceration.”); cf. 
BRIAN JARVIS, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: PUNISHMENT AND U.S. CULTURE 14 (2004) 
(“The mythology of the Land of the Free can be seen as an ideological smokescreen 
designed to obscure the systematic deprivation of liberty and infliction of 
punishments, both cruel and unusual.”). 
 19. MUSHLIN, supra note 17, at 63 (discussing how the Court arrived at Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). 
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medical need,”20 coining the legal standard “deliberate indifference” 
that governs specific isolated actions of prison officials.21 According 
to the deliberate indifference standard, the State is required to 
provide a level of medical care that meets routine and emergency 
health care needs, including physical, dental, and psychological or 
psychiatric care.22 If an imprisoned person believes they are being 
denied or unreasonably delayed access to necessary medical care by 
deliberately indifferent state officials, they are entitled to claim that 
those officials violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment.23 
Meanwhile in the medical world, 1979 saw the development of 
the first widely-recognized standards of care for persons 
experiencing gender identity dissonances, and as of 2020 these 
standards are in their seventh version.24 These World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) Standards of Care 
have a widely accepted treatment plan for those experiencing acute 
 
 20. The definition of what is a serious medical need remains vaguely defined and 
open to each court’s subjective perception. Id. at 389–95. For a discussion of circuit 
treatment of GD, see Bourcicot, supra note 10, at 295–96 (arguing the majority of 
circuits recognize GD as a serious medical need, with the Fifth and Tenth Circuits 
as anomalies). See also Susan S. Bendlin, Gender Dysphoria in the Jailhouse: A 
Constitutional Right to Hormone Therapy, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 957, 967 (2013) (“To 
the extent that the circuits differ, it is not over whether Gender Dysphoria 
constitutes a serious medical need, but over whether treatment is warranted in a 
specific case, and if so, what type of treatment should be provided. The objective 
prong of the test under § 1983—‘serious medical need’—can typically be satisfied by 
the inmate.”). 
 21. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (creating the rule that deliberate 
indifference to an imprisoned person’s serious medical needs by prison guards or 
doctors constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment 
and gives rise to a civil rights cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also 
MUSHLIN, supra note 17, at 65. 
 22. Bendlin, supra note 20, at 977 (“When the State takes someone into custody 
and deprives him of the ability to take care of himself, the State assumes some duty 
to provide for his basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, personal safety, and 
medical care.”); see also MUSHLIN, supra note 17, at 371–73 (noting incarcerated 
individuals are wholly dependent on prison staff for medical care, which is especially 
significant because studies suggest imprisoned persons have a higher than average 
need for medical care—both from statistically higher medical concerns coming into 
prison such as mental illness, HIV/AIDS, etc., as well as from the probability of 
sustained injuries and newly-arising health concerns during—and arguably 
resulting from—incarceration). 
 23. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. 
 24. Rudolph Alexander, Jr. & Jacquelyn C. A. Meshelemiah, Gendered Identity 
Disorders in Prisons: What Are the Legal Implications for Prison Mental Health 
Professionals and Administrations?, 90 PRISON J. 269, 274 (2010). 
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GD involving three sequential steps: 1) hormone therapy, 2) a 
period of time living as the opposite gender, and 3) GCS.25 
It is important to note that some in the trans community and 
their advocates are resistant to the pathologizing of GD.26 Instead 
of understanding transgenderism as “a matter of natural diversity” 
that is not “inherently pathological or negative,” the powerfully 
coercive force of the dominant binary understanding of gender 
relegates trans bodies to the unnatural.27 Those who do not conform 
to traditional gender binaries face pervasive social and economic 
discrimination, leading to a greater likelihood of being in the 
criminal justice system.28 Physicians—a small medical elite—have 
traditionally been our gatekeepers regulating gender 
nonconformity. Physicians control access to medical diagnostic 
categories that have reinforced sexist/heterosexist norms, 
recognizing only those who can narrate their gender experiences 
 
 25. WORLD PROF’L ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, INC., STANDARDS OF CARE 
FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING 
PEOPLE 1–7, 27–28 (7th ed. 2012), https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/ 
SOC%20v7/Standards%20of%20Care%20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH.pdf?_t= 
1605186324 [https://perma.cc/BYL6-PNJZ] [hereinafter WPATH]. For a discussion 
of criticisms of these standards, see Osborne, supra note 10, at 1650–51 (“Although 
they were formulated by experienced clinicians and scholars, most SOC 
recommendations are based on low-quality evidence, such as case series and expert 
opinion. The SOC also do not represent the experiences and practices of all GD 
experts, and some provisions of the SOC seem to reflect political considerations 
rather than scientific evidence or clinical experience.” (citations omitted)). 
 26. See M. Dru Levasseur, Gender Identity Defines Sex: Updating the Law to 
Reflect Modern Medical Science Is Key to Transgender Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 943, 
952 (2015) (discussing transgender community feelings on their medicalization); see 
also Bendlin, supra note 20, at 961 (“The issue is a sensitive one because the 
diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria as a medical illness has a negative connotation to 
members of the transgender community. If, however, the condition is not recognized 
as an illness, then medical treatment may not be deemed necessary.”). 
 27. Levasseur, supra note 26, at 946–47 (noting that “[t]his simplistic 
understanding of sex, as two fixed binary categories, is medically, scientifically, and 
factually inaccurate, but still broadly enforced by courts”); see also Marybeth Herald, 
Transgender Theory: Reprogramming Our Automated Settings, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 167, 169 (2005) (“[G]eneralizations about the biological differences between 
men and women often petrify into rigid and inaccurate stereotypes . . . so barnacled 
with associations that we can no longer separate out the purely biological from its 
cultural appendages.”); Green, supra note 2, at 78 (“Visible external genitalia, 
presumed chromosomal make-up, and presumed reproductive capacity are viewed 
as primal, objective, fixed, and ‘true’ only because the external genitalia is the first 
observable differentiator—or characteristic of social significance—that people see in 
an infant. However, to define ‘sex’ as the fixed point of a compass that always tells 
us the ‘truth’ about a person is both archaic and naive.”). 
 28. Sydney Tarzwell, The Gender Lines are Marked with Razor Wire: Addressing 
State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of Transgender Prisoners, 38 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167, 167–68 (2006) (discussing transgender persons’ 
exclusion from the legitimate economy). 
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within those categories.29 Thus, like homosexuality, being 
transgender was placed in the American Psychiatric Association’s 
DSM-V where the medical voice of authority originally called it a 
disorder.30 The trans community has fought for decades to see this 
stigmatization of transgenderism removed.31 
Like homosexuality, GD has been migrating towards 
normalization. Homosexuality was removed as a disorder from the 
DSM in 1973, and the original Gender Identity Disorder (GID) was 
reclassified as GD in 2013, signifying a shift in understanding 
gender as distinct from binary sex.32 While mental distress or 
impairment is a common symptom or comorbid symptom of GD, 
many now claim it is an organic disorder that should be treated as 
a physical problem, not pathologized.33 While this progress is 
positive, the trans community still faces a serious medical/legal 
dilemma:34 rely on the Eighth Amendment to seek gender-affirming 
medical care but legitimize medical authority and reinscribe the 
problematic medical/legal model,35 or insist on broader systemic 
change while—for the foreseeable future—sacrificing basic rights 
that include the right to medical care?36 
 
 29. Id. at 174. 
 30. DSM-V, supra note 11; GENDER DYSPHORIA, supra note 11. 
 31. Walter Bockting, The Impact of Stigma on Transgender Identity Development 
and Mental Health, in GENDER DYSPHORIA AND DISORDERS OF SEX DEVELOPMENT: 
PROGRESS IN CARE AND KNOWLEDGE 319, 321–22 (Baudewijntje P. C. Kreukels et al., 
eds., 2014). 
 32. GENDER DYSPHORIA, supra note 11; Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: 
Depathologizing Homosexuality, 5 BEHAV. SCI. (BASEL) 565 (2015). 
 33. See Alexander, supra note 24, at 271 (discussing the push to depathologize 
GD). 
 34. See Silpa Maruri, Hormone Therapy for Inmates: A Metonym for Transgender 
Rights, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 807 (2011) (observing that labeling GD 
as a mental illness is “a double-edged sword” that is “at odds with the transgender 
community’s conceptualization of itself” because “while it allows access to hormone 
therapy, it does so by describing transgender individuals as somehow sick or infirm”). 
 35. See Tarzwell, supra note 28, at 189 (discussing the medical/legal model of 
GD). 
 36. See Phyllis Randolph Frye, The International Bill of Gender Rights vs. The 
Cider House Rules: Transgenders Struggle with the Courts over What Clothing They 
Are Allowed to Wear on the Job, Which Restroom They Are Allowed to Use on the Job, 
Their Right to Marry, and the Very Definition of Their Sex, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN 
& L. 133, 214 (2000) (including the right to competent medical and professional care 
regardless of “chromosomal sex, genitalia, assigned birth sex, or initial gender role”); 
see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(asserting the Declaration applies to everyone regardless of sex in Article 2 and 
affirming everyone’s right to medical care in Article 25). Compare Stephen B. Levine, 
Reflections on the Legal Battles over Prisoners with Gender Dysphoria, 44 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 236, 240 (2016) (arguing these rights-based advocacy 
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B. An Overview of Gender Dysphoria and Its Medical 
Treatment 
The rise of transgender rights activism has been resisted as an 
assault on the United States’ heteronormative empire, where 
assumptions about the stability of biological sex and residual 
Western philosophies of a sex-based natural order are gradually 
being called emperors with no clothes.37 Nevertheless, medical 
professionals have generally accepted standards of care for gender-
nonconformists—“based on the best available science and expert 
professional consensus”—that they can and should follow.38 
WPATH, creator of the transgender Standards of Care, is an 
international multidisciplinary association promoting evidence-
based clinical care for gender non-conforming people.39 WPATH 
asserts that the expression of gender characteristics is not 
something assigned by biological sex at birth, and its expression is 
not inherently pathological whether it conforms to that assigned sex 
or not.40 GD is fundamentally an experience of being out-of-sync 
with that assigned sex at birth accompanied by the associated 
gender role and sex characteristics expected by society.41 When that 
dissonance rises to a significant level of distress, GD is diagnosed 
as acute and has indicated treatments.42 In the context of a social 
hierarchy that legitimizes and empowers traditionally gender-
conforming bodies, such dissonances are inevitable.43 Treatment for 
 
approaches to trans medical care are harmfully agenda-driven because “[c]ombining 
science and advocacy produces problems” where “[s]cience provides a dispassionate 
view of what seem to be the facts” while “[a]dvocacy aims at attaining a specific goal, 
and it musters the facts that support that goal”), with Green, supra note 2, at 30 
(arguing science only goes so far in changing norms because “[s]cientific discoveries 
are interesting, even exciting for some people, but they are heresies for others, 
dismissible, irrelevant, mere theories until they are validated by whatever system 
has been allocated greater authority”). 
 37. See Rena Lindevaldsen, A State’s Obligation to Fund Hormonal Therapy and 
Sex-rReassignment Surgery for Prisoners Diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, 
7 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 15, 27–28, 45–47 (2012) (defending the heteronormative status 
quo and arguing science, medicine, and the law are being hijacked by politically 
liberal ideologies trying to “play[] God” by denying that “gender is an immutable 
trait, is binary in nature, and coincides from birth with an individual’s sex” and that 
gender identity is something a child’s family fosters “by teaching the child gender-
appropriate behavior”). 
 38. WPATH, supra note 25, at 1. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 4. 
 41. Id. at 5. 
 42. Id. 
 43. This Note follows the premise that American society has created the rigid 
rules that members of its society existentially cannot follow, then pathologized 
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GD began in the second half of the twentieth century with a growth 
of awareness among medical professionals of the severity of the 
dissonances being experienced.44 Changes in gender expression, 
psychotherapy, hormone therapy, and surgery have been typical 
treatment options.45 
To meet the currently accepted standards of care for a patient 
with GD, a medical professional must evaluate a patient’s GD, 
provide information about treatment options and risks, assess and 
treat relevant mental health concerns, and then refer a patient for 
the chosen treatment.46 
GCS to change primary or secondary sex characteristics 
typically includes altering the chest/breasts, external or internal 
genitalia, facial features, or body contouring,47 and it is “often the 
last and the most considered step in the treatment process for 
gender dysphoria.”48 WPATH has found such surgeries to be 
indicated, effective, and medically necessary for some patients.49 To 
say these surgeries are medically necessary means that they are not 
merely elective procedures,50 but are provided only when patients 
 
and/or punished the results. See CUSAC, supra note 4 (documenting the intertwined 
nature of Christianity and American cultural norms, including the protection and 
reinforcement of those norms through the scapegoating of norm-transgressors and 
their subsequent punishment). This ritual of the scapegoat—one who legitimizes and 
reinscribes an organizing myth through symbolic punishment—is a common theme 
in Christianity. See Leviticus 16:21–22 (telling how, in the Old Testament, the nation 
of Israel would send a sacrificial lamb into the wilderness to be killed once a year, 
heaped symbolically with their collective transgressions); John 1:29 (telling how, in 
the New Testament, Christ becomes this sacrificial “Lamb of God,” heaped 
symbolically with the sins of the world). In the American myth, we orient and cleanse 
ourselves by sending Black Americans, those experiencing systemic poverty, and the 
gender nonconforming—among others—to prison, heaped symbolically with our 
culture’s transgressions. 
 44. WPATH, supra note 25, at 8. 
 45. Id. at 9–10. 
 46. Id. at 23–28. 
 47. Id. at 10. 
 48. Id. at 54. Of those opting for surgical treatment, satisfaction rates across 
studies ranged from 87% of male-to-female (MtF) patients to 97% of female-to-male 
(FtM) patients, with regrets about this choice being an extremely rare 1–1.5% of MtF 
patients and <1% of FtM patients. Id. at 8. 
 49. Id. at 54–55. 
 50. See Jody Marksamer & Harper Jean Tobin, Standing with LGBT Prisoners: 
An Advocate’s Guide to Ending Abuse and Combating Imprisonment, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
TRANSGENDER EQUAL., 55 (2013) (“[B]oth the American Medical Association (‘AMA’) 
and the American Psychological Association (‘APA’) have adopted public statements 
that reject the misconception that transition-related medical care is ‘cosmetic’ or 
‘experimental,’ and recognize such care as effective, therapeutic, and a ‘medical 
necessity . . . for appropriately evaluated individuals.’”) (citing AM. MED. ASS’N 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES, AMA RESOL. 122 (A-08) and AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, APA POLICY 
STATEMENTS ON LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER CONCERNS (2009)). 
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meet specific criteria: 1) persistent, well-documented GD; 2) 
capacity to give informed consent; 3) age of majority; 4) reasonably 
well controlled medical or mental health concerns; 5) twelve 
continuous months of hormone therapy; and 6) twelve continuous 
months of living in a gender role congruent with their gender 
identity.51 As some of these criteria suggest, GD is often 
accompanied by mental health concerns, including anxiety, 
depression, self-harm, a history of abuse and neglect, compulsivity, 
substance abuse, sexual concerns, personality disorders, eating 
disorders, psychotic disorders, and autistic spectrum disorders.52 
When an individual with acute GD is denied the option for surgical 
intervention, they commonly experience depressive symptoms that 
may include suicidal ideation.53 
The WPATH Standards of Care specify that “[h]ealth care 
for . . . gender-nonconforming people living in an institutional 
environment [such as prison] should mirror that which would be 
available to them if they were living in a non-institutional setting 
within the same community.”54 As a result, prison policies 
regarding gender-nonconforming populations are in various stages 
of incorporating these new norms.55 The 2019 Edmo decision was 
the first time that a federal appeals court has ordered the State to 
pay for an incarcerated person’s GCS under the Eighth 
Amendment.56 
 
 51. WPATH, supra note 25, at 60 (noting that these are the criteria for a 
metoidioplasty or phalloplasty in FtM patients and for a vaginoplasty in MtF 
patients). 
 52. Id. at 24. 
 53. See Osborne, supra note 10, at 1655 (documenting this suicidality indicator); 
see also: 
I had come so far in my transition, and the actions by the hospital felt like 
a complete rejection of who I am. I had rejected myself for 29 years; having 
my surgery canceled brought back all of those feelings, despite five years of 
progress and acceptance. It made me feel like I wanted to crawl out of my 
own skin again. 
Evan Minton, What It Was Like to Be Denied Medical Care Because of My Gender, 
VICE (June 29, 2018), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/evk34n/denied-medical-
care-transgender-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/VC4M-KQ]. 
 54. WPATH, supra note 25, at 67; see also Position Statement on Transgender 
Health Care in Correctional Settings, NAT’L COMM. ON CORR. HEALTH CARE (2009), 
https://www.ncchc.org/transgender-transsexual-and-gender-nonconforming-health-
care [https://perma.cc/X4GD-HU73] (suggesting that the proper approach to 
transgender medical care is to follow the WPATH Standards of Care). 
 55. See generally Tarzwell, supra note 28 (analyzing forty-four states’ practices 
and policies on the management of transgender imprisoned persons). 
 56. Lateshia Beachum, Idaho Must Pay for an Inmate’s Gender Confirmation 
Surgery, a Court Says. The Governor Is Fighting It., WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2019), 
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C. The Eighth Amendment and Its Enforcement Through 
the Medical Necessity Doctrine 
The Eighth Amendment is a normative chameleon that 
prohibits “cruel and unusual” punishment.57 Early Supreme Court 
cases observed the difficulty of defining “cruel and unusual.” The 
first proxy was a “manifestly cruel” standard which “forbade only 
the most extreme punishments” likened to torture—crucifixion, 
beheading, burning alive, quartering, disembowelment, and similar 
practices.58 In 1968, Judge Blackmun observed that “the limits of 
the Eighth Amendment’s proscription are not easily or exactly 
defined,” but that its “applicable standards are flexible,” guided by 
“broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, 
humanity, and decency . . . .”59 Thus, it absorbs its standards from 
the society around it; it is as cruel as we are. 
The idea that incarcerated individuals have a right to health 
is also rooted in the Eighth Amendment.60 When a person is 
lawfully incarcerated, they are deprived of certain rights and 
privileges, but in general they still retain their constitutional 
protections.61 Specific to this Note’s focus, under current 
interpretations, the State has an Eighth Amendment obligation to 




[https://perma.cc/9JHX-UURM] (reporting on this historic decision). 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 58. Bourcicot, supra note 10, at 290 (citing the Court’s prohibition of such 
practices in In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446–47 (1890) and Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 
U.S. 130, 135–36 (1878)). See CUSAC, supra note 4, at 33, 48–49, 53, 99, 104, 212, 241 
(noting that nevertheless, execution, physical restraints, gags, water punishments, 
beatings, pulley systems for stretching, sweat boxes, solitary confinement, and stun 
belts are just some of the range of cruelties that have been imposed on U.S. 
imprisoned persons—some disallowed, others lingering on, some disallowed and 
then reallowed, and some disallowed but likely to return). Though it is easy to think 
of these norms as linear progress, they are not. The progression of these cruelty 
norms is cyclical, with periodic resurgences of practices previously thought cruel and 
outmoded, such as the resurgence of solitary confinement. Id. at 63, 241. 
 59. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968). 
 60. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (“Our more recent cases, however, 
have held that the Amendment proscribes more than physically barbarous 
punishments.”). “Health,” like what is “cruel and unusual,” is a dynamic concept. It 
depends not only on appropriate clinical diagnosis and treatment for those 
experiencing GD such as Edmo and Gibson, but also on “social and political climates 
that provide and ensure social tolerance, equality, and the full rights of citizenship,” 
necessitating “legal reforms that promote tolerance and equity for gender and sexual 
diversity and that eliminate prejudice, discrimination, and stigma.” WPATH, supra 
note 25, at 1–2. 
 61. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510–11 (2011). 
 62. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103. 
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to do so would make imprisonment cruel. In this way, serious 
medical needs become proxies for suffering that is cruel to allow, 
where suffering has been medicalized into symptoms. Prison 
officials are given wide discretion in determining medical treatment 
for imprisoned persons and are presumed to be providing 
appropriate care.63 However, when officials fail to provide necessary 
medical care with deliberate indifference to an imprisoned person’s 
known serious medical need, the Eighth Amendment is violated.64 
This proxy test for violation of the Eighth Amendment is known as 
the doctrine of medical necessity. 
A person imprisoned who seeks to prove the violation of their 
Eighth Amendment protections embodied in medical necessity must 
meet both an objective and subjective threshold.65 They must 
objectively show that: 1) denying the needed medical care was 
against any competent recognized medical authority;66 2) at the 
time of denial they were experiencing a severe and obvious illness 
or injury;67 3) the denial was not due to mere negligence by the 
prison official(s), but demonstrates instead deliberate 
indifference;68 and 4) resulting harm.69 Thus, the objective 
threshold is a heavily fact-dependent analysis in which courts must 
 
 63. See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 96 (1st Cir. 2014); Jones v. Falor, 
135 F. App’x 554, 556 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 64. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th 
Cir. 2005). 
 65. Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The objective 
‘medical need’ element measures the severity of the alleged deprivation, while the 
subjective deliberate indifference element ensures that the defendant prison official 
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”). 
 66. Important to GD, the objective test requires that the medical treatment is 
necessary, not optional or elective, although more than mere labels are required to 
make an “elective” determination. See Garrett v. Elko, No. 95-7939, 1997 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 21271, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 12, 1997) (“[P]rison officials cannot avoid [E]ighth 
[A]mendment liability for denying a prisoner treatment necessary to address a 
serious medical need simply by labeling the treatment ‘elective.’”). 
 67. The severity of the illness or injury being intentionally ignored is typically 
determined by a court through consideration of the effect of denying treatment. 
Miller v. Beard, 699 F. Supp. 2d 697, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 68. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994). See Dolovich, supra note 
18, at 972–73 (discussing how Farmer shows the Supreme Court fundamentally 
misunderstands the collective bargain struck between the State and civil society 
when it “accord[s] state actors the same privilege of disregard and even obliviousness 
to the fate of imprisoned offenders that the public takes for granted”—resulting in a 
virtual “guarantee that the people being held in those prisons will suffer gratuitous 
physical and psychological harm”). 
 69. E.g., Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1970) (the harm of 
permanent disfigurement); Kelley v. Hicks, 400 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2005) (the 
harm of exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)). 
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weigh each incarcerated individual’s particular circumstances at 
the time of the alleged rights violation. 
An incarcerated person must also subjectively show the State 
was deliberately indifferent to their serious medical need. 
“Deliberate indifference” to an imprisoned person’s Eighth 
Amendment rights subjectively exists where a prison official: 1) 
knows of the person’s treatment need but intentionally refuses to 
provide it; 2) delays necessary medical treatment for non-medical 
reasons; or 3) prevents the person from receiving needed or 
recommended treatment.70 “This does not mean that every prisoner 
complaint requires immediate diagnosis and care, but that, under 
the totality of the circumstances, adequate medical treatment be 
administered when and where there is reason to believe it is 
needed.”71 This subjective threshold is typically met when there is 
potential deprivation of life itself or infliction of permanent 
injuries.72 Thus, the bar for the doctrine of medical necessity is high. 
D. The 2019 Edmo and Gibson Decisions Created a Federal 
Circuit Split 
With this Eighth Amendment analysis in mind, this Note will 
turn to the facts and outcomes of the Ninth Circuit’s Edmo and the 
Fifth Circuit’s Gibson, two cases decided in 2019 in which 
incarcerated individuals experiencing acute GD alleged a violation 
of their Eighth Amendment rights under the doctrine of medical 
necessity. 
 
 70. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976); see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839 
(likening the “cruel and unusual” standard under the Eighth Amendment to the 
subjective recklessness standard used in criminal law); see also Bourcicot, supra note 
10, at 294 (“The wide discretion afforded prison officials allows them to weigh 
inmates’ medical needs against ancillary factors—such as the availability of 
treatment, the cost of treatment, and administrative difficulties in administering 
treatment—without necessarily running afoul of the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 71. Mills v. Oliver, 367 F. Supp. 77, 79 (E.D. Va. 1973); see Bourcicot, supra note 
10, at 294 (stating prison officials have been found deliberately indifferent when they 
used cost as the sole basis for deciding not to provide treatment, when they 
consciously chose an “easier and less efficacious” treatment, when they ignored 
medical advice, or when “extreme bureaucratic inefficiencies or passive resistance” 
resulted in inadequate medical care). 
 72. See, e.g., McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112, 115 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (“A 
refusal to furnish medical care when it is clearly necessary, such as is alleged here, 
could well result in the deprivation of life itself; it is alleged that plaintiff suffered 
paralysis and disability from which he will never recover. This amounts to the 
infliction of permanent injuries, which is, to some extent, a deprivation of life, of 
liberty and of property. Since these rights are protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the complaint sufficiently alleges the 
deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws of 
the United States.”). 
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i. Adree Edmo’s Ninth Circuit Case Affirmed GCS as a 
Medical Necessity 
In Edmo v. Corizon,73 the question before the court was 
whether GCS was medically necessary for Adree Edmo, a 
transgender incarcerated individual.74 The Ninth Circuit decision, 
a unanimous opinion written by Judges M. Margaret McKeown, 
Ronald M. Gould, and Robert S. Lasnik, observed that this question 
 
 73. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019). This Note will focus on 
Parts I and III of the opinion, dealing with GD, GCS, medical necessity and the 
Eighth Amendment. Part II considers the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the 
injunction issued by the lower court, and mootness. To briefly summarize, the district 
court had granted injunctive relief ordering GCS. The Ninth Circuit affirmed that 
the district court made the “need-narrowness-intrusiveness” findings required under 
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) to maintain the injunction and thus, the appeal was not 
moot. Because the permanent injunction had not expired, but was simply stayed, the 
Ninth Circuit denied the State’s motion to dismiss. Further, the injunction was held 
to be appropriate against the individuals in their personal or official capacities who 
participated in depriving Edmo of her Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 782–84. 
 74. Adree Edmo was born in 1987 and grew up on the Shoshone-Bannock Indian 
reservation in Fort Hall, Idaho. LOCKED: I’m Not a Monster like Most People Think, 
BOISE ST. PUB. RADIO (episode 1, July 8, 2019), https://www.boisestate 
publicradio.org/topic/locked [https://perma.cc/ZWT9-43QP]; see Amended Complaint 
at 37, Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. (D. Idaho Sept. 1, 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00151-BLW). 
Her mother, Michaeline “Micki” Edmo, testified in court she considered her own care 
of her children to have been sometimes inadequate, noting that she permitted them 
to be exposed to situations that she now regrets. LOCKED, supra. Described by those 
who knew her as a child as “strong-willed,” “sassy,” possessed of a “great sense of 
humor,” and a lover of the musician Selena’s work, Adree Edmo’s gender identity 
was always complicated. Id. It was only as a young adult that she identified herself 
as “two-spirit.” See Amended Complaint, supra at 39. “Two-spirit” is a newer term 
for the concept shared by some Native American tribes in which an individual 
identifies as both a male and a female—“tainna wa’ippe” on the Shoshone-Bannock 
reservation, literally translating “man-woman.” LOCKED, supra. See also Harlan 
Pruden & Se-ah-dom Edmo, Two-Spirit People: Sex, Gender & Sexuality in Historic 
and Contemporary Native America, NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS POL’Y RES. CTR., 
http://www.ncai.org/policy-research-center/initiatives/Pruden-Edmo_TwoSpirit 
People.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LHR-NJVU]. Shoshone-Bannock elder and former 
judge, Clyde Hall, notes that traditionally many Native American cultures accepted 
those who did not conform to just one gender, but with colonization and the arrival 
of Christian missionaries, Native American peoples were told such non-binary people 
were an “abomination.” LOCKED, supra. Since entering the criminal justice system, 
Edmo has apologized and expressed regret for her criminal actions, citing her 
alcoholism as a weakness that derailed her from her plans to become a physician. Id. 
“I’m not a monster like most people think,” Edmo has stated. Id. When the Ninth 
Circuit decided in Edmo’s favor, she released this statement: “I am relieved and 
grateful the court recognized my right to necessary medical treatment, and that I 
will get the surgery I need. I hope my case helps the State of Idaho understand that 
they can’t deny medical care to transgender people.” Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. 
Lesbian Rts., Federal Appeals Court Rules Idaho Department of Corrections Must 




2021] The Edges Are Bleeding 123 
invoked the Eighth Amendment that must normatively “take[] 
[into] account . . . developing understanding”—in this case—“of 
increased social awareness” on “transgender health care.”75 The 
court affirmed the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho 
finding that Edmo had established her76 Eighth Amendment rights 
were violated because GCS was medically necessary in her 
particular case.77 The court ordered the State to provide the 
surgery.78 In doing so, Judges McKeown, Gould, and Lasnik 
acknowledged that their decision contradicted that of the Fifth 
Circuit in Gibson v. Collier, but observed the reason for the different 
outcome was that “Gibson relie[d] on an incorrect, or at best 
outdated, premise: that ‘there is no medical consensus that GCS is 
a necessary or even effective treatment for gender dysphoria.’”79 
Edmo’s case facts read, at first glance, as a typical “case of 
dueling experts.”80 The supporting evidence for Edmo included that 
she was a MtF transgender imprisoned person,81 that she 
experienced GD because her sex at birth (male) was different from 
her gender identity (female),82 that this resulted in ongoing mental 
distress that limited her ability to function,83 that she had a pattern 
of self-harm,84 and that twice she had attempted life-endangering 
self-castration.85 Experts established that Edmo’s GD was a serious 
medical condition requiring the medically-recognized treatment of 
GCS.86 In doing so, they relied on the WPATH Standards of Care87 
and agreed that while GCS is not the appropriate course of 
treatment for all who experience GD, Edmo’s was acute and 
necessitated treatment through GCS.88 In their opinions, without 
 
 75. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 803. 
 76. This Note will follow the Ninth Circuit’s use of Ms. Edmo’s preferred female 
pronouns. 
 77. The Ninth Circuit specifically limits its decision to this set of facts. See Edmo, 
935 F.3d at 767. However, the court holds that where a prison has “a de facto policy 
or practice of refusing treatment for gender dysphoria to prisoners,” this would 
amount to deliberate indifference. Id. at 781. 
 78. Id. at 803. 
 79. Id. at 795 (quoting Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 223 (5th Cir. 2019)) 
(adding “[t]he Fifth Circuit is the outlier”). 
 80. See id. at 787. 
 81. Id. at 767. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 774. 
 85. Id. at 767. 
 86. Id. 
 87. The court finds the WPATH Standards of Care “are the gold standard on this 
issue.” Id. at 788–89. 
 88. Id. at 767. 
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this treatment, Edmo would continue to suffer irreparable harm, 
both mentally and physically.89 Thus, failure to provide GCS 
constituted deliberate indifference in the face of Edmo’s obvious 
ongoing suffering.90 
The State argued that while Edmo’s suffering met the 
threshold to trigger the Eighth Amendment, its agents were not 
deliberately indifferent to her suffering because they used 
medically-accepted standards of care to determine the appropriate 
course of treatment for Edmo was not GCS.91 The State’s physician 
who treated Edmo, Dr. Scott Eliason, evaluated Edmo’s GD in 2016 
using the WPATH Standards and his own professional 
understanding of GD to determine GCS was not medically 
necessary.92 In his opinion, GCS would only be necessary where 
there was “(1) ‘congenital malformations or ambiguous genitalia,’ 
(2) ‘severe and devastating dysphoria that is primarily due to 
genitals,’ or (3) ‘some type of medical problem in which endogenous 
sexual hormones were causing severe physiological damage.’”93 
Eliason had determined Edmo did not meet any of these criteria.94 
The court found the State’s evidence “illogical and unpersuasive.”95 
The State also argued that its facility staff did not fail to act; 
rather, they were affirmatively providing medical care they believed 
to be appropriate.96 Eliason had prescribed treatment through 
hormone therapy and counseling, with continued monitoring and 
future assessments.97 This course of treatment was based on 
Eliason’s belief that Edmo’s mental health was not under the 
adequate control required to consider more serious interventions, 
such as GCS, as well as that Edmo had not lived in her identified 
gender role for twelve months in the world outside of prison.98 The 
 
 89. Id. at 776. 
 90. Id. at 785. 
 91. Id. at 773. 
 92. Id. at 773–74. 
 93. Id. at 773. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 789. One of Edmo’s experts, Dr. Ryan Gorton, testified that Eliason’s 
three criteria were inconsistent with the WPATH Standards of Care: the first was 
inapplicable because it related to intersex conditions, not those experiencing GD; the 
second required severe and devastating gender-focused dysphoria when WPATH 
required only “clear and significant dysphoria;” and finally, the third was simply 
described as “bizarre.” Id. at 778. 
 96. Id. at 793. 
 97. Id. at 773. 
 98. Id. at 774. These are among the WPATH criteria for GCS, supra note 25. 
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court found this evidence unconvincing as well, concluding the State 
had indeed violated Edmo’s constitutional rights.99 
ii. Vanessa Lynn Gibson’s Fifth Circuit Case Denied GCS 
as a Medical Necessity 
In Gibson v. Collier,100 the question the court chose to answer 
was whether the lower court erred in finding that there was “no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact” in the Eighth Amendment 
case brought by Vanessa Lynn Gibson101 and thus, that the lower 
 
 99. Id. at 792. The district court found that Edmo’s self-harm was not evidence 
of a lack of mental health control, but rather evidence of a denial of medically 
necessary care. See id. at 781. The court agreed with experts who stated that there 
is no WPATH requirement that the twelve months of living in an identified gender 
role can only happen outside of prison. Id. Further, the court noted “a prisoner need 
not prove that he was completely denied medical care” to make out an Eighth 
Amendment claim. Id. (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(en banc). 
 100. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 101. Vanessa Lynn Gibson has lived as a female since the age of 15. Complaint at 
¶ 10, Gibson v. Livingston (W.D. Tex. June 8, 2015) (No. 6_15-cv-00190). Details 
available about Gibson’s life prior to prison are few, but one source claims she had a 
seventh-grade educational level prior to being imprisoned and has the goal of 
becoming a paralegal. Scott Gibson #699888, WRITEAPRISONER, 
https://writeaprisoner.com/inmates/scott-gibson-699888/education 
[https://perma.cc/ZWG8-AMBX]. Once imprisoned, Gibson described her situation in 
an interview as follows:  
I feel like my constitutional rights are being violated because [the TDCJ is] 
indiscriminately denying us medical care for no reason . . . . Having male 
genitalia, it makes me literally sick. I’m talking about to the point that I 
hate my life and it’s an everyday thing. 
David Artavia, Supreme Court Rejects Inmate’s Case for Gender Confirmation 
Surgery, ADVOCATE (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.advocate.com/transgender/2019/ 
12/10/supreme-court-rejects-inmates-case-gender-confirmation-surgery 
[https://perma.cc/RBV3-SQ]. Gibson had asked a prison physician if she could receive 
a sex-reassignment surgery and was told she could only be treated with hormones 
“because TDCJ-ID has a Ban on Sex Reassignment Surjery [sic].” Supra, Complaint 
at ¶ 20. When she was denied GCS, she asked prison officials if “she could have a 
pass to live as a female, to dress as a female and to keep her hair at least 7 inches 
long,” but that, too, was denied. Id. at ¶ 23. While imprisoned, Gibson’s art and 
poetry have been posted online. Justice for Vanessa Gibson, JUSTICE FOR VANESSA, 
https://justiceforvanessa.wordpress.com [https://perma.cc/B37W-6R3Z]. On the 
experience of being a transgender person, she wrote: 
and I’m not ashamed of my tears / we have had our bones broken / faces 
smashed / eyes blackened / and faces sliced wide open, / and some of our 
bones will never be found / because they’re rotting in a shallow grave / 
knowing this, / I refuse to be anyone you want me to be. / I’d rather die for 
our rights / then to let you win. 
I See Your Hate, JUSTICE FOR VANESSA (Apr. 19, 2016), https://justicefor 
vanessa.wordpress.com/2016/04/19/i-see-your-hate-a-poem-by-vanessa/ 
[https://perma.cc/CPF5-T34Q]. After the Fifth Circuit’s decision, Gibson wrote: 
For years the court system have [sic] allowed prison officials to get away 
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court correctly held the named state officials of the Texas prison 
were “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”102 The Fifth Circuit’s 
majority opinion, written by Judge James C. Ho, claimed to travel 
the well-trodden path of established precedent that the Eighth 
Amendment does not guarantee whatever medical care an 
imprisoned person requests.103 Instead, the care required by the 
Constitution is calibrated to “society’s minimum standards of 
decency.”104 The substantive, normative question was whether the 
deprivation of GCS was against those minimum standards.105 The 
legal question was procedural: had the lower court impermissibly 
dismissed a case when there was a real dispute?106 The majority 
affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas in 
finding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact because 
medical necessity rested on a medical treatment being indicated, 
and here the majority agreed there was no medical consensus for 
the treatment of GD on which to base medical necessity.107 
The majority further argued if these procedural flaws were not 
sufficient dismissal grounds, the substance also allowed the court 
to dismiss Gibson’s appeal as a matter of law.108 Judge Ho looked to 
the plain text and original meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s 
“cruel and unusual” language and found that only what was 
routine, regular, or customary was “usual.”109 Since “cruel and 
unusual” is conjunctively joined, cruelty alone was found 
permissible under the Eighth Amendment as long as it was not also 
unusual.110 Thus, evidence of Gibson’s suffering that might 
otherwise indicate cruelty was present—self-harm and suicidality 
translated into medical symptoms—was irrelevant unless and until 
 
with beating inmates, denying us medical care, murdering inmates, 
allowing gay inmates to be beaten and raped by coward ass gang members, 
and there is basically nothing we can do about it! If we can’t trust the court 
and believe that it will protect us—what are we supposed to do? 
Response to Lawsuit Dismissal: Gibson vs Brad Livingston, JUSTICE FOR VANESSA 
(Apr. 26, 2019), https://justiceforvanessa.wordpress.com/2019/04/26/response-to-
lawsuit-dismissal-gibson-vs-brad-livingston/ [https://perma.cc/M95H-D3FW]. 
 102. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 219 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)). The district court was 
actually asked to decide summary judgment based on TDCJ’s qualified immunity 
and Eleventh Amendment immunity claims, but also sua sponte decided summary 
judgment on the merits as well. 
 103. Id. at 216. 
 104. Id. (quoting Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 96 (1st Cir. 2014)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 219. 
 107. Id. at 223, 226. 
 108. Id. at 228. 
 109. Id. at 226–27. 
 110. Id. at 226. 
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most prisons in the U.S. routinely, regularly, or customarily provide 
GCS to incarcerated individuals.111 
Gibson, a MtF transgender imprisoned person112 and a pro se 
plaintiff,113 was experiencing acute distress, depression, and self-
harming urges that had risen to multiple attempted suicides.114 
She115 asked the court to remand her case so that “[s]he [could] 
present evidence of [her] individual need for sex reassignment 
surgery.”116 She meanwhile provided the WPATH Standards of 
Care as support for her claim, as well as her affidavit, grievance 
records, psychiatric records, correspondence with her penitentiary 
healthcare team, and Texas Department of Criminal Justice 
(TDCJ) Policy G-51.11.117 TDCJ Policy G-51.11 required that 
Gibson, as a transgender imprisoned person, have her individual 
case and treatment evaluated by appropriate medical and mental 
health professionals using “[c]urrent, accepted standards of care.”118 
Where Edmo is replete with case facts, Gibson is sparse. The 
TDCJ Director presented Gibson’s grievance records, medical 
records, and G-51.11 to demonstrate Gibson received medical 
treatment according to G-51.11.119 While not cited by the State, the 
 
 111. Id. at 227. This reductive grammatical argument fails to adequately capture 
the meaning of “cruel and unusual” because the two are not wholly discrete. They 
are more like a Venn diagram—and a Venn diagram in constant motion as society 
wrestles with its norms over time. Here, the Fifth Circuit insisted that if these 
particular legal norms change, it would not be through their courtroom, pinning the 
courtroom to courtrooms of the past. To be credible, the court needed to acknowledge 
that normative lines of the Eighth Amendment move and admit that their Circuit 
would move the line only when less change-averse sister circuits had already 
sufficiently paved the way. 
 112. Id. at 216–17. 
 113. Id. at 218. It is possible Gibson’s pro se status impacted the outcome of her 
case, although it is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions from this procedural 
point that differentiates Gibson from Edmo. 
 114. Id. at 217. 
 115. Although the Fifth Circuit used male pronouns following the Texas 
Department of Criminal Justice, this Note will use Ms. Gibson’s preferred female 
pronouns. 
 116. Id. at 223–24 (citing Oral Argument at 11:35–12:10, 13:27–16:22, Gibson v. 
Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019)). 
 117. Id. at 220–21, 232. 
 118. Id. at 217–18 (citing Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Policy G-51.11: 
Treatment of Offenders with Intersex Conditions, or Gender Dysphoria, Formerly 
Known as Gender Identity Disorder (2017), https://www.tdcj.texas.gov/divisions/ 
cmhc/docs/cmhc_policy_manual/G-51.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UDQ-AS3F] 
[hereinafter G-51.11]). 
 119. Texas Department of Criminal Justice Step 1 Offender Grievance Form, 
Grievance No. 2015096265 filed by Scott L. Gibson (2015) (“Your allegation is 
unsubstantiated. You are receiving treatment for Gender Dysphoria per the 
policy . . . G-51.11.”). 
128 Law & Inequality [Vol. 39:1 
Fifth Circuit invoked a persuasive First Circuit case from four years 
earlier called Kosilek v. Spencer, which found there was no medical 
consensus requiring provision of GCS to incarcerated individuals 
experiencing acute GD.120 Effectively importing Kosilek’s fact 
record, Judge Ho used that case to find Gibson’s mere preference for 
GCS was not a basis for a claim of deliberate indifference when the 
course of treatment was medically-disputed.121 The majority 
grounded its holding in its Eighth Amendment Fifth Circuit 
precedent that has historically rejected “claims in cases involving 
medical disagreement.”122 Without a medical consensus as per 
Kosilek, the court found the facts were all on TDCJ’s side; Gibson 
raised no genuine dispute of material fact that her constitutional 
rights were being violated.123 
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale 
argued that there are a number of problems with the majority’s 
decision and that the case should have been remanded.124 First, the 
dissent observed procedural inadequacies. The lower court’s 
summary judgment decision itself was improper under Rule 56(f) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because its sua sponte 
departure from the basis for the motion to make its decision 
deprived Gibson of notice and a chance to respond.125 Additionally, 
both Judge Ho and the district court improperly placed the burden 
of discovery on Gibson, the non-moving party, rather than on the 
State as per summary judgment procedures.126 The State did not 
meet this burden because it failed to present evidence that showed 
 
 120. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 220–21 (citing Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 68 (1st 
Cir. 2014) and observing the First Circuit “exhaustively detailed the underlying 
expert testimony” to demonstrate “objective evidence that the medical community is 
deeply divided about the necessity and efficacy of sex reassignment surgery” in 
Gibson’s case). While Kosilek included expert testimony that treated GCS both 
positively and negatively, the court simply notes the positive exists in one sentence 
after dedicating over a page and a half recounting the negative. Id. at 221–23. 
 121. Id. at 220, 226. Ironically, Gibson had not requested GCS as a treatment; she 
had asked to be medically evaluated and prescribed a course of treatment 
appropriate to her medical evaluation as per her original grievance form: “NOTE: I 
AM NOT REQUESTING A SEX CHANGE AT THIS TIME!” Texas Department of 
Criminal Justice Step 1 Offender Grievance Form, supra note 119. For similar 
reasoning to the Fifth Circuit here on patient preferences, see also Lamb v. Norwood, 
899 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding an imprisoned person named Michelle 
Renee Lamb, who was born male but identifies as female, was not entitled to GCS 
because her current hormone and counseling treatments were determined to be 
adequate by prison officials despite Lamb’s strong disagreement). 
 122. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 225. 
 123. Id. at 224. 
 124. Id. at 228. 
 125. Id. at 228–30. 
 126. Id. at 231. 
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the absence of a dispute.127 The majority also improperly borrowed 
evidence from Kosilek to support the State—a past case that the 
State did not cite as support in district court.128 Thus, where the 
lower court improperly offered a sua sponte decision for the 
defendant, here the majority improperly offered a sua sponte fact 
record for the defendant. Additionally, in the territory of the Eighth 
Amendment that is sensitive to changes in norms over time, 
substituting a past case’s fact record to presume present norms is 
inappropriate.129 Indeed, Judge Barksdale cited to the District of 
Idaho’s Edmo decision to demonstrate that the normative winds 
showed a change since Kosilek.130 
In addition to identifying these procedural errors, the dissent 
argued that the majority erred in formulating its substantive 
question as well. The question was not whether there was a lack of 
medical consensus about GCS, but “whether there [was] a 
disagreement about the efficacy of the treatment for this particular 
prisoner, based on this prisoner’s individual needs.”131 Because the 
Eighth Amendment requires a fact-specific inquiry, the majority 
could not affirm a lower court that decided such a case without the 
facts—and it certainly could not affirm it by substituting in facts 
from another case.132 In fact, it remained unclear what Gibson’s 
individual medical needs were, since G-51.11 “prohibit[ed] 
[imprisoned persons] from even seeing a Doctor to be evaluated to 
see whether or not they need Sex Reassignment Surjery [sic] to 
adeqaty [sic] treat their illness.”133 Gibson wanted to be evaluated, 
the very medical care guaranteed to her by G-51.11, and the very 
information required for the court to make an indifference 
determination.134 Instead of recognizing such evaluative evidence 
was necessary to decide the merits of Gibson’s case, the majority 
instead nonsensically considered Kosilek’s medical needs as per her 
 
 127. Id. at 232. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. The majority argues that “[t]here is no reason why—as a matter of either 
common sense or constitutional law—one state cannot rely on the universally shared 
experiences and policy determinations of other states.” Id. at 224. The convincing 
Supreme Court counterargument to this, given by Judge Blackmun over fifty years 
earlier, is that the Eighth Amendment is norm-sensitive. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 
571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968). 
 130. Id. at 234 (citing Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1127 
(D. Idaho 2018)). 
 131. Id. at 240. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Complaint at ¶ 27, Gibson v. Livingston, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195724 (W.D. 
Tex. Aug. 31, 2016) (No. W-15-CA-190). 
 134. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 233. 
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medical experts.135 However, Kosilek and Edmo were evaluated 
individually, and the dissent opined that Gibson should also have 
been evaluated based on her own medical needs.136 Finally, the 
dissent noted that the Fifth Circuit was not at liberty to perform an 
originalist analysis of the proxies for the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment because the 
Supreme Court already established those standards in 1976 
through Estelle.137 
Two Circuits enforcing two markedly different rights 
standards for two Americans within the space of a few months of 
each other, but just one governing law: the Eighth Amendment. 
What makes Edmo’s treatment cruel and unusual as decided in 
2019, and how can that be reconciled with the dismissal of Gibson’s 
similar case that same year? Where should the Supreme Court align 
itself given the circuit divide? The next Part of this Note will explore 
the tensions at play in these cases and argue that the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision, while still problematic, is normatively right and 
should be adopted by the Supreme Court.138 
II. The Reasons Why the Supreme Court Should Follow 
Edmo’s Lead 
This next Part will analyze each court’s application of the 
doctrine of medical necessity to illustrate that the Ninth Circuit 
correctly applied the doctrine, whereas the Fifth Circuit did not. 
While this might provide some indication of which Circuit’s 
precedent the Supreme Court should follow, the current 
conservative-leaning Court may hold out additional challenges 
against adopting a stance that could be viewed as socially-
progressive. Thus, this Part will also discuss and rebut arguments 
 
 135. Id. “The majority apparently believes Gibson was never entitled to due 
process for this claim because Kosilek, an out-of-circuit opinion, has foreclosed any 
advancement in the law and medical research in this area.” Id. at 238. 
 136. Id. at 237. In fact, TDCJ’s Dr. Greene wrote a clinic note in Gibson’s file that 
read: “Please schedule [Gibson] with unit MD for evaluation for referral for sex 
change operation and evaluation for medical pass for gender identity disorder.” Id. 
The evaluation never occurred because G-51.11 was understood to not allow it. Id. 
The dissent argued this alone likely provided sufficient grounds to allege 
indifference. Id. at 239. 
 137. Id. at 242 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). The dissent’s 
exasperation is clear; the majority has needlessly waxed eloquent on Eighth 
Amendment standards while refusing to correctly apply them. 
 138. The Supreme Court did not take up either Gibson or Edmo for appeal. Gibson 
v. Collier, 205 L.Ed.2d 384 (U.S. 2019); Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, No. 19-1280, 
2020 U.S. LEXIS 4867 (Oct. 13, 2020). 
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that might be employed in the Supreme Court to defend following 
the Fifth Circuit’s more conservative Gibson decision. 
A. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Applied the Doctrine of 
Medical Necessity 
Since the facts of Edmo and Gibson were strikingly similar, 
the question of which Circuit made the right decision is primarily a 
question of law: Which Circuit applied the medical necessity 
doctrine correctly? The first step to answering this question 
requires a review of the circumstantial facts that surrounded the 
denial of GCS to Edmo and Gibson: What symptoms had prison staff 
observed? What were their current medical diagnoses? What 
harmful effects were being risked by the denial of GCS?139 
In Edmo, the Ninth Circuit discussed the symptoms of acute 
GD that Edmo experienced at length.140 These included distress 
“that impairs or severely limits the person’s ability to function in a 
meaningful way” reaching a threshold that requires intervention;141 
that causes an individual to feel depressed, embarrassed, disgusted, 
tormented, and hopeless,142 potentially leading to coping 
mechanisms including addiction, self-harm, or suicide;143 that is an 
“everyday recurring thought,”144 including regular thoughts of self-
harm;145 that may lead to self-medication, including “cutting” one’s 
body because “the physical pain helps to ease the ‘emotional 
torment’ and mental anguish.”146 Without “an appropriate 
treatment plan[,] [GD] can expose . . . individuals to a serious risk 
of psychological and physical harm;”147 and risks “further emotional 
decompensation,”148 “ongoing mental anguish and possible physical 
harm,”149 and “debilitating distress, depression, impairment of 
function, substance use,” “self-injurious behaviors,” and suicide.150 
 
 139. For generally accepted medical steps that should guide such questions, see 
WPATH, supra note 25, at 23–28. 
 140. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 772–73 (9th Cir. 2019). But see Levine, 
supra note 36, at 244 (arguing we should mistrust these facts about representations 
of psychological pain because they may frequently be the manipulations of 
individuals with pathologies fueling a “motive to annoy”). 
 141. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 769 (quoting the DSM-V, supra note 11, at 453, 458). 
 142. Id. at 772. 
 143. Id. at 773. 
 144. Id. at 772. 
 145. Id. at 774. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 771. 
 148. Id. at 787. 
 149. Id. at 785. 
 150. Id. at 769. 
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In this detailed context, Edmo’s physician knew Edmo had clinically 
“significant” distress leading to repeated self-castration attempts 
likely to continue, and yet did not reevaluate or change the 
ineffective treatment plan.151 Thus, the court had little trouble 
affirming the district court’s finding that the State was deliberately 
indifferent to Edmo’s GD when—despite full knowledge152—it 
denied her the generally accepted treatment in the face of the 
present and future risk of serious harm.153 That deliberate 
indifference was cruel and unusual punishment. 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit appeared fact-averse in its 
Gibson decision. The court offered a cursory review of GD, noting 
symptoms included “clinically significant distress or impairment in 
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”154 
Judge Ho then observed Gibson had demonstrated acute distress, 
depression, attempts to castrate or otherwise self-harm, suicidal 
ideation, and three suicide attempts.155 The majority noted that 
while these symptoms were observed, it was not Gibson’s specific 
symptoms that were critical to the case; rather, it was G-51.11.156 
G-51.11 did not designate GCS as the treatment protocol for Gibson, 
and so the medical staff were not deliberately indifferent in 
providing it to her despite her known symptoms.157 Of this blanket, 
categorical denial, the Edmo court observed that such a “de facto 
policy or practice . . . amounts to deliberate indifference” in and of 
itself.158 The Gibson court thus fails to apply the medical necessity 
doctrine correctly because its conclusion relies on the wrong facts; 
it is not prison policy that determines medical care, but an 
assessment of an individual’s particular serious medical needs in 
light of generally-accepted treatments—regardless of whether the 
prison policies accept those treatments or not.159 
Once the circumstantial facts regarding an individual’s 
observed symptoms, diagnoses, and risks of harm have been 
reviewed, a court also must determine what the accepted course of 
medical treatments are and if one was appropriately selected given 
 
 151. Id. at 793. 
 152. Id. at 767. 
 153. Id. at 781. 
 154. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 217 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting the DSM-V, 
supra note 11, at 453). 
 155. Id. at 217, 219. 
 156. Id. at 223–24. 
 157. Id. at 217–18. 
 158. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 781, 796–97. 
 159. Id. at 797 (citing Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 91 (1st Cir. 2014)). 
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these facts.160 Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits agreed that if there 
are widely accepted medical treatment standards for GD, these set 
a chain reaction in motion for potential Eighth Amendment 
claims.161 The primary tension here is that the Fifth Circuit showed 
a marked resistance to accepting that such standards exist and 
include GCS, whereas the Ninth Circuit was among a majority 
consensus that accepts there are such standards.162 This makes 
sense given that normative changes see resistance, but at this point 
it is a weak argument that transgender medical care has not been 
widely accepted.163 The Ninth Circuit observed this, noting that the 
 
 160. The medical system and its treatments are often portrayed as providing 
equal care for all bodies, but we know this is not the case. Comedian and political 
commentator John Oliver recently observed that “if you are a woman and/or a person 
of color in the US, you may well have a very different relationship to our healthcare 
system than a white man.” Adrian Horton, John Oliver: Bias in Medical Care Is a 
‘Discussion That We Need to Have’, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.the 
guardian.com/culture/2019/aug/19/john-oliver-last-week-tonight-recap-medical-
care-bias [https://perma.cc/HEM4-BQRA]. This is because biases have profoundly 
shaped the medical field through the use of the White male body as a stand-in for all 
bodies in the studies that have resulted in our medical diagnoses criteria. Id. Such 
biases have caused misdiagnoses and a needless “mortality gap” for non-White, non-
male bodies. See, e.g., Lili Barouch, Heart Disease: Differences in Men and Women, 
JOHNS HOPKINS MED., https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/heart_vascular_institute/ 
centers_excellence/womens_cardiovascular_health_center/patient_information/heal
th_topics/heart_disease_gender_differences.html [https://perma.cc/MV4F-6PML]; 
Roni Caryn Rabin, Huge Racial Disparities Found in Deaths Linked to Pregnancy, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/health/ 
pregnancy-deaths-.html [https://perma.cc/DB4J-W4KN]. These biases have also led 
to a medical community that lacks knowledge about transgender bodies as well: 
It is simply easier to say “we don’t know” than it is to apply resources to 
verify a physical origin of [transgenderism], especially when only a relative 
few people are affected . . . . [N]ot knowing contributes to the ease with 
which trans people continue to be marginalized and treated as less than 
human. Not knowing also allows for religious opinion to be asserted as fact, 
and for the media to exercise its imagination in search of profits at trans 
people’s expense. 
Green, supra note 2, at 84. 
 161. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 223; Edmo, 935 F.3d at 787. 
 162. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 223; Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795. 
 163. The WPATH Standards of Care have been accepted by: 
the American Medical Association, the American Medical Student 
Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American 
Psychological Association, the American Family Practice Association, the 
Endocrine Society, the National Association of Social Workers, the 
American Academy of Plastic Surgeons, the American College of Surgeons, 
Health Professionals Advancing LGBTQ Equality, the HIV Medicine 
Association, the Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay and Transgender Physician 
Assistant Caucus, and Mental Health America. 
Edmo, 935 F.3d at 769; see also Bourcicot, supra note 10, at 307 (“Sex reassignment 
surgery has been accepted in the medical community for decades as an appropriate 
and sometimes necessary treatment for gender dysphoria.”). Interestingly, the 
WPATH Standards of Care are actually cited in G-51.11 itself, a fact seeming to 
contradict the Fifth Circuit’s position. G-51.11, supra note 118. 
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Fifth Circuit was the outlier fighting the last battle against this 
change.164 Indeed, the labors the Fifth Circuit’s resistance required 
in Gibson are a window into the effort and tools courts may use to 
defend an increasingly untenable status quo. The dissent in Gibson 
rightly identified a procedural breach of summary judgment rules, 
a refusal to allow the case facts to be presented, a substitution of 
facts from an entirely different case, and an insistence that while 
reviewing the merits of the case was beyond the case’s scope, 
nevertheless ink would be spilled on the merits in order to cement 
the Eighth Amendment in place—a futile, Sisyphean task to arrest 
a clause built to move over time. The Supreme Court will need to 
contend with the reality of an existing medical consensus which 
strongly favors following the Edmo court’s decision. 
Once there is an accepted medical treatment—which the Fifth 
Circuit does not admit—medical necessity claims require that 
treatment must then be delayed, denied, or otherwise hampered by 
officials who know or should know the care the particular 
individual’s case necessitates.165 This denial cannot simply be 
negligent but must be knowing and intentional.166 Here, the Gibson 
court argued GCS was not an accepted treatment, and therefore 
could not be delayed, denied, or otherwise hampered by the State.167 
The Edmo court, accepting the WPATH Standards, found Eliason’s 
refusal to follow them and to provide GCS treatment when Edmo’s 
GD showed acute symptoms amounted to deliberate indifference.168 
Thus, when the Supreme Court faces a question of medical 
necessity for GCS, the outcome will largely depend on whether it 
accepts that GCS is a valid medical treatment. 
B. Why Might the Supreme Court Resist Edmo and Follow 
Gibson? 
The Ninth Circuit observed that it was “not the first to speak 
on the subject [of transgender health care], nor [would it] be the 
last.”169 The Supreme Court can, and likely will, speak on the 
 
 164. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795. Green argues that in the twenty-first century, we are 
seeing a legal trend where such medically-based arguments have seen “traction in 
securing affirmative recognition for trans people and their civil (in the U.S.) or 
human rights (in the U.K. and Europe).” Supra note 2, at 63–64. 
 165. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). 
 166. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994). 
 167. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 228. 
 168. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 797. 
 169. Id. at 803. 
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subject to resolve this circuit split in the future.170 The previous 
section details the Ninth Circuit’s persuasively superior use of the 
medical necessity doctrine to suggest the Supreme Court should 
follow its precedent as a matter of law. Nevertheless, while unlikely 
to repeat the gross procedural irregularities of the Fifth Circuit, 
there are counterarguments that a majority conservative Supreme 
Court might rely on to delay realizing these new gender norms for 
an unpopular incarcerated subpopulation. 
Behind a number of the following arguments is the premise 
that what is happening within trans medical standards of care is 
either the apolitical, scientifically fact-based, morally-right status 
quo of pathologizing GD through an impartial, binary sex-based 
assessment, or the political, advocacy-driven, norm-upsetting 
minority rights agenda usurping it.171 Yet science is not apolitical, 
facts must be selected for use or left to disuse, and knowledge 
advances through the questions normatively permitted and 
funded.172 Raising the accusation that for medical science to explore 
non-binary gender is for medicine to become political is thus a false 
claim. Furthermore, the claim that even when trans health is 
 
 170. MUSHLIN, supra note 17, at 490. A writ of certiorari may be granted by the 
Supreme Court when “a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in 
conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same 
important matter . . . as to call for an exercise of [the Supreme] Court’s supervisory 
power.” SUP. CT. R. 10. The number of circuits whose decisions typically must join a 
divide for the Court to grant certiorari on a question is difficult to calculate, but 
studies consistently show that while not a guarantee, the Court is far more likely to 
review requests implicating a circuit court conflict, with such conflict cases 
comprising roughly one-third of the Court’s docket. See Deborah Beim & Kelly Rader, 
Evolution of Conflict in the Courts of Appeal 3 (2015 Midwest Pol. Sci. Ass’n Ann. 
Meeting, Preliminary Draft, (June 25, 2015)) http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2623304. 
The greater the number of circuits who have taken a position, the greater the 
likelihood a question will be resolved by the Court, although splits between only two 
circuits have still seen grants of certiorari. Id. at 19. And of course, the Court can 
only take up a question when there is an existing petition for certiorari. Id. at 23–
24. 
 171. These strongly felt political divides over sex and gender were reflected in the 
Fifth Circuit’s recent justification for refusing to use a transgender person’s 
preferred pronouns while claiming this refusal was a neutral and impartial position. 
See United States v. Varner, 948 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 2020) (noting federal courts 
today must “decide cases that turn on hotly-debated issues of sex and gender 
identity” and to use the pronouns litigants request, even for “the most benign 
motives[,]” may convey a court’s “tacit approval” and raise the appearance of bias). 
In response, one commentator noted, “Good for Judge Duncan for both adhering to 
the letter of the law and for defiantly standing athwart the modern cultural Left’s 
pernicious insistence on gaslighting the American citizenry into thinking that words 
may not mean what they so clearly do, in fact, mean.” Josh Hammer, Culture War in 
the Courts: Federal Appeals Panel Rejects Transgender Pronouns, DAILY WIRE (Jan. 
17, 2020), https://www.dailywire.com/news/culture-war-in-the-courts-federal-
appeals-panel-divides-on-transgender-pronouns [https://perma.cc/NJ9A-KW5B]. 
 172. See discussion of medical bias, supra note 160. 
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explored, there is no consistent scientific evidence supporting 
normative changes is patently false.173 With this ideological 
struggle as background, the following are some arguments that 
could support a Supreme Court decision to follow Gibson. 
First, like the Fifth Circuit, some will undoubtedly argue that 
the time has not yet arrived to recognize GCS as the “usual” medical 
care for severe GD.174 The Fifth Circuit argued that an incarcerated 
individual’s suffering from a serious medical need does not alone 
activate Eighth Amendment protections without a “universal” 
medical consensus on treatment.175 If outdated assumptions about 
the binary nature of gender are still “usual” and there remain 
medical professionals who hold them, hormone therapy and surgery 
may be viewed as misguided “collaboration[s] with psychosis.”176 To 
avoid “indulg[ing] a [transgender] prisoner’s improper self-image,” 
the proper treatment is still long-recognized counseling to help the 
 
 173. The proof is in the results. Osborne, supra note 10, at 1652 (“SRS, in 
conjunction with cross-sex hormone therapy, has repeatedly been demonstrated to 
be associated with substantial reduction in GD symptoms, high levels of patient 
satisfaction, few significant complications, and minimal instances of regret.” 
(citations omitted)). See NCD 140.3, Transsexual Surgery, DAB No. 2576, 1, 8 (U.S. 
Dep’t Health & Human Servs. May 30, 2014), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/static/dab/decisions/board-decisions/2014/dab2576.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM69-
4ANR] (“We have no difficulty concluding that the new evidence, which includes 
medical studies published in the more than 32 years since issuance of the 1981 
report . . . demonstrates that [transgender] surgery is safe and effective and not 
experimental.”); see also Green, supra note 2, at 61 (observing that, unfortunately, 
such new medical evidence can be hard to incorporate into the law with its focus on 
consistency and precedent guarded by judges who may feel compelled “to reduce 
complexity and even reject inconvenient new information” to privilege such values); 
What Does the Scholarly Research Say About the Effect of Gender Transition on 
Transgender Well-Being?, CORNELL U.: WHAT WE KNOW (2020), 
https://whatweknow.inequality.cornell.edu/topics/lgbt-equality/what-does-the-
scholarly-research-say-about-the-well-being-of-transgender-people/ 
[https://perma.cc/F9EB-7EQJ] (analyzing all peer-reviewed articles on gender 
transition published between 1991 and June 2017, with fifty-one studies concluding 
gender transition “improves the well-being of transgender people,” four having 
“mixed or null findings,” and none indicating “overall harm”). 
 174. See Bourcicot, supra note 10, at 311 (“Challengers who claim that they need 
surgical intervention should expect prisons and courts to resist ordering that 
taxpayer dollars be spent on various sex reassignment surgeries for a condition that 
is not well-understood by the general public and that is rare in society writ large.”). 
 175. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 219–20 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 176. Green, supra note 2, at 25–26; see also Levine, supra note 36, at 241 
(suggesting some transgender imprisoned persons will “sacrifice genitalia to give a 
new organizing purpose to life” based on this pathology); Lindevaldsen, supra note 
37, at 26 (arguing GD is a belief that does not align with reality, and “an anorexic is 
not encouraged to believe she is overweight and in need of losing weight; she is 
encouraged to attain a proper understanding of the role of food in her life and a 
healthy self-perception”). But cf. Osborne, supra note 10, at 1657 (arguing “it is 
legally and ethically obligatory to make SRS available to inmates for whom it is 
medically necessary”). 
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transgender individual accept their birth-sex gender.177 However, 
this withholding of WPATH Standards of Care because its 
treatments have not become “usual” enough or because they grate 
against beliefs about binary gender norms belongs to normative 
outliers.178 Ignoring the robust medical consensus that our 
understanding of gender has changed—in the context of a judicial 
test that is supposed to do the very opposite on behalf of 
incarcerated persons—seems distastefully draconian.179 Given this 
backdrop, it is unlikely the Supreme Court would make a decision 
that does not genuinely grapple with the medical consensus that 
gender is not simply binary, counseling alone is not an adequate 
remedy for many with GD, and that GCS is the indicated treatment 
for some with acute GD.180 
Perhaps some will argue WPATH Standards are the best 
possible medical care—the kind allegedly not necessary to provide 
to imprisoned persons.181 Best here seems to bleed into notions of 
elective care, but elective according to the public mob rather than 
the medical professional. For example, many emphasized that no 
taxpayer funding should be used for what is perceived as elective on 
a national petition demanding GCS be withheld from an imprisoned 
person.182 This denial of tax funding appears to scratch a flagrantly 
 
 177. Bendlin, supra note 20, at 977. 
 178. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 795 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 179. See Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Prisoners 
in the United States have a right to humane treatment, including a right to adequate 
care for their serious medical needs. The Constitution does not protect this right 
because we are a nation that coddles criminals. Rather, we recognize and respect 
this right because we are, fundamentally, a decent people, and decent people do not 
allow other human beings in their custody to suffer needlessly from serious illness 
or injury.”). 
 180. See Bendlin, supra note 20, at 979 (observing that “physicians, psychologists, 
judges, insurance agents, and even the Tax Court have weighed the evidence and 
have concluded that psychotherapy and psychiatric medications are not ‘adequate’ 
treatment in most [acute GD] cases”). 
 181. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mayweather v. 
Foti, 958 F.2d 91, 91 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting imprisoned persons are not entitled to 
“the best [treatment] that money c[an] buy”)). The “cheap and custodial quality of 
institutional care” has been justified by the belief that dependence is a 
“manifestation of an inferior and hopeless condition”—a condition being punished by 
a society embracing a protestant ethic seasoned with capitalism that believes to fail 
in the marketplace is to fail morally. CUSAC, supra note 4, at 129–30, 132. 
 182. No Sex Change for Prison Inmate, MOVEON, https://sign.moveon.org/ 
petitions/no-sex-change-for-prison?fbclid=IwAR1JeLDYvveUnzwCV5pKC-
ZzzgkuJA_RLu92jDdPre0IwtQBlofNkOr2us4&r_hash=Hgoo1HVS&source=s.icn.fb 
[https://perma.cc/BVV8-MXEL] (Carrie H. commented, “My tax dollars should never 
go to a convicted felon and child sex offender. He deserves nothing but a noose!” 
Spencer F. commented, “So if I do a crime, I get free cosmetic surgery? You loose [sic] 
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retributivist itch where the guilty require punishment and that 
punishment should—overtly or implicitly—not avoid 
unpleasantness, particularly when it is less expensive to do 
nothing.183 This sentiment appears further exacerbated by the U.S. 
medical system where care is expensive and not guaranteed to its 
citizens, magnifying the perception that it is unjust and unfair that 
incarcerated persons are guaranteed free medications, 
psychotherapy, and even surgery.184 Nevertheless, difficult as this 
may be for some, once we have “tolled the bell” for an incarcerated 
person, “whether we like it or not, we have made him our collective 
responsibility. We are free to do something about him; he is not.”185 
Additionally, the cost of GD treatments is “not unusually expensive” 
and is “actually less costly than other types of medical care that 
many prisoners receive.”186 And certainly mob standards are not 
medical standards; while the WPATH Standards recognize that the 
standards represent flexible guidelines, they are not intended to 
flex in contravention of “the many core principles that undergird 
 
your rights to be a person and have rights when you commit a crime. You go to jail, 
to prison, and you have no rights. Have him pay for it himself when he gets out.” 
Darlene D. commented, “[N]o way should taxpayers have to pay for this[]. ‘IT’ can 
pay for it when it gets out !!!!!!! [sic]”) [https://perma.cc/XAK9-9PWA]. See generally 
Carol S. Steiker, Death, Taxes and—Punishment? A Response to Braithwaite and 
Tonry, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1793, 1797 (1999), including: 
[Q]uite apart from serving as a subtle proxy for race or class hatred, harsh 
penological practices give people a new ‘outsider’ to hate, at a time when so 
many other outsiders have become more assimilated into society. Criminals, 
after all, are criminals . . . . Why it should be that people need some 
‘outsider’ to hate and blame is a good question; but that people seem to need 
such a scapegoat is supported by much of human history. 
(emphasis in original). 
 183. See Green, supra note 2, at 30 (“Institutionalized transphobia makes hatred, 
abuse, and inhumane treatment appear logical, natural, and even correct.”). Green 
observes such naturalizing of transphobia shows our cost-conscious efficiency 
concerns are pretextual and are fundamentally about the scapegoating of 
transgender people because we fear violated boundaries. Id. 
 184. Bendlin, supra note 20, at 976. 
 185. Id. at 978 (quoting Justice Blackmun, Address by the Chief Justice, 25 Rec. 
of the Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 14, 17 (Mar. 1970 Supp.)). In an age of mass 
incarceration, America is a society of frenetic bellringing. As Dolovich observes, 
“[t]he greater society’s appetite for imprisoning convicted offenders, the greater the 
burden.” Supra note 18, at 972. 
 186. For example:  
In Fields v. Smith, the court refuted and discredited the earlier Maggert 
dicta about the high cost of Gender Dysphoria treatments by pointing to 
evidence that the cost of hormone therapy varies between $300 and $1,000 
per inmate per year whereas a common anti-psychotic drug costs the prison 
more than $2,500 per inmate per year. Additionally, although gender-
reassignment surgery costs roughly $20,000, the Department of Corrections 
“paid $37,244 for one coronary bypass surgery and $32,897 for one kidney 
transplant surgery.” 
Bendlin, supra note 18, at 965. 
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the [Standards of Care]”—including non-pathologizing respect for 
nonconforming gender identities, care that reduces the distress of 
GD, a pursuit of GD knowledge, and treatment approaches tailored 
to specific patient needs and goals.187 These principles set the floor 
for care, not a ceiling below which we may choose lesser-but-still-
adequate care.188 And it goes without saying that the long-term 
solution, of course, “is not to take away medical care from prisoners; 
it is to improve the availability of health care to all citizens.”189 
Some will likely argue that the relevant harms are self-
inflicted and common to this trans subpopulation, regardless of 
their housing situation and their course of medical treatment.190 
Correlation and causation cannot be easily untangled. What we 
know is that “[s]uicide is the leading cause of death in jails and 
85[%] of U.S. prison systems report that self-injurious behavior 
occurs at least once a week.”191 The Department of Justice notes 
that “[t]he rates of inmate suicide are far higher than the national 
averages, and even higher still for special populations (including 
 
 187. WPATH, supra note 25, at 3. 
 188. Even if some will argue that these WPATH principles do not set the floor, the 
pitting of tax savings against incarcerated health seems a gesture of short-term 
thinking, fostering a hostile separation that does not likely lend itself to post-
incarceration reintegration. 
 189. Bendlin, supra note 20, at 976. 
 190. See Osborne, supra note 10, at 1653 (“Community-dwelling persons with GD 
display an elevated prevalence of comorbid mental health problems, including mood 
disorders, anxiety disorders, and suicidality and these comorbid conditions do not 
significantly improve after SRS. Comorbid psychiatric conditions usually do improve, 
at least initially, after cross-sex hormone therapy. But while subsequent SRS usually 
ameliorates GD and increases overall life satisfaction, it appears to confer little or 
no additional improvement in other psychiatric symptoms.” (citations omitted)); see 
also Levine, supra note 36, at 240, 242 (arguing that excuses are made for trans 
individuals to externalize rather than own their pathologies, where “[a]ny concurrent 
mental symptoms, such as anxiety states, suicidal preoccupations, suicide attempts, 
or substance abuse and unempathic aggression toward others, are viewed as 
consequences of social rejection,” which, in turn, serves a misguided medical 
community that refuses to admit they are failing to appropriately treat depression). 
 191. Further: 
Suicide is the leading cause of death in local jails, accounting for over one-
third of jail deaths in 2013; it is less frequent in prison settings but still 
accounted for nearly 6[%] of the deaths of people in state custody in 2013. 
Although suicide rates in jail declined steadily from 129 deaths per 100,000 
people in 1983 to 47 deaths per 100,000 in 2002, the rate of suicide increased 
by 12[%] between 2008 and 2013 and the suicide mortality rate is three 
times higher in jail populations than in either prison populations or the 
community. 
Leah Pope & Ayesha Delany-Brumsey, Creating a Culture of Safety: Sentinel Event 
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juvenile and LGBTI inmates) . . . .”192 Self-harm in correctional 
settings lacks comprehensive national data, but research estimates 
“up to 15[%] of adults and up to 24[%] of young people engage in 
non-suicidal self-injury while in custody (defined as ‘deliberate, self-
inflicted tissue damage without intent to die’); rates are even higher 
when the person has a mental health disorder (up to 61[%]).”193 We 
also know that GCS is not a cure-all, and suicide rates ten years 
after GCS are still high.194 Yet studies also show that depressive 
symptoms and suicidal ideation increase among imprisoned persons 
with GD when treatment is unavailable or when expression of their 
gender is constrained.195 Additionally, studies suggest that GCS 
provides relief to many experiencing GD and that regret rates are 
low.196 Moreover, this argument ignores what creates the duty for 
these medical professionals under the Eighth Amendment. The 
duty is created because the State limits and controls access to 
 
 192. Suicide in Corrections, NAT’L INST. CORR., U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://nicic.gov/suicide-in-corrections [https://perma.cc/9CN8-J28U]. See Holly 
Hedegaard, Sally C. Curtin & Margaret Warner, Suicide Mortality in the United 
States, 1999–2017, NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 330 Nov. 2018, at 1, https://www.cdc.gov/ 
nchs/data/databriefs/db330-h.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5TN-CZQV] (noting suicide has 
been the tenth leading cause of death for all ages in the U.S. since 2008 and has been 
on an increasing trend with approximately 14 deaths by suicide per 100,000 
Americans in 2017 for a total of 47,173 suicides that year); see also  McCauley, supra 
note 10, at 35 (“In the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, nearly 40% of transgender 
people reported experiencing serious psychological stress in the month before the 
survey (compared with 5% of the U.S. population broadly), 7% attempted suicide in 
the year before the survey (compared with 0.06% of the U.S. population broadly), and 
40% had attempted suicide in their lifetime (almost nine times the U.S. rate).”). 
 193. Pope, supra note 191, at 3; see also Donna Gillies, Maria A. Christou, Andrew 
C. Dixon, Oliver J. Featherston, Iro Rapti, Alicia Garcia-Anguita, Miguel Villasis-
Keever, Pratibha Reebye, Evangelos Christou, Nagat Al Kabir & Panagiota A. 
Christou, Prevalence and Characteristics of Self-Harm in Adolescents: Meta-analyses 
of Community-Based Studies 1990–2015, 57 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY 733, 736–37 (2018) (finding about 17% of adolescents will self-harm in 
their lifetime, with self-cutting as the most common form of self-harm); Tori 
DeAngelis, Who Self-Injures?, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 60, 60 (2015), 
https://www.apa.org/monitor/2015/07-08/who-self-injures [https://perma.cc/P4B5-
4L7L] (finding that adults have a reported lifetime self-harm rate of about 5%). 
 194. See Cecilia Dhejne, Paul Lichtenstein, Marcus Boman, Anna L.V. Johansson, 
Niklas Långström & Mikael Landén, Long-Term Follow-Up of Transsexual Persons 
Undergoing Sex Reassignment Surgery: Cohort Study in Sweden, 6 PLOS ONE, 
e16885, 2011, at 2 (citing various follow-up studies noting post-GCS suicides were 
still attempted and/or completed at varying rates, with more studies needed); see also 
Osborne, supra note 10, at 1653 (noting GCS “appears to confer little or no additional 
improvement in other psychiatric symptoms”). 
 195. Osborne, supra note 10, at 1655. 
 196. WPATH, supra note 25, at 8 (noting recent GCS satisfaction rates were at 
87% for MtF patients and 97% for FtM patients, with the regret rate hovering around 
1%); see also Osborne, supra note 10, at 1652 (observing GCS has repeatedly been 
demonstrated to reduce GD symptoms and produce both high patient satisfaction 
and low regret rates). 
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medical care, assuming responsibility for each incarcerated person’s 
wellbeing197—even for subpopulations who might not choose (or be 
able to choose) to access such care in the general population, or who 
enter prison terminally ill. For example, take an individual with 
poorly managed asthma, a history of self-cutting, terminal cancer, 
or someone who, through the effects of poverty, has delayed a 
necessary surgery. These individuals, once incarcerated, are no less 
entitled to necessary medical care simply because they would have 
suffered constricted breathing, self-inflicted injuries, an inevitably 
painful course of treatment ending in death, or the pain of a 
surgery’s delay outside of the institution. As soon as the State 
assumes responsibility for incarcerated persons, the Eighth 
Amendment applies without regard to medical outcomes that might 
have occurred in an imprisoned person’s non-incarcerated 
alternative reality. 
Others may argue that imprisoned persons are an atypical 
subpopulation of the trans community, and therefore, transgender 
standards of health care simply were not designed—nor can they 
be—with such persons in mind.198 This is directly countered by the 
WPATH Standards themselves which clearly intend to encompass 
the transgender prison population.199 Some argue that we are in a 
catch-22 because in order to determine what medical standards of 
care are appropriately tailored to imprisoned transgender persons, 
we must be allowed to do medical experimentation on those 
imprisoned subjects, which would be viewed as unethical.200 
However, this argument merely points out the inevitable knowledge 
gap all medicine faces since we also consider children, pregnant 
women, fetuses, mentally disabled persons, and economically or 
educationally disadvantaged individuals to be unable to consent to 
studies, though some argue we should rethink this ethical 
 
 197. Bendlin, supra note 20, at 977 (“When the state takes someone into custody 
and deprives [them] of the ability to take care of [themself], the state assumes some 
duty to provide for [their] basic needs such as food, shelter, clothing, personal safety, 
and medical care.”). 
 198. Osborne, supra note 10, at 1651 (“Inmates who seek treatment for GD 
typically display little resemblance to the patients who present for treatment in the 
community, and prison life bears little resemblance to life in the community. The 
[Standards of Care] were not developed with the complexities, vulnerabilities, and 
life circumstances of incarcerated persons in mind.”). 
 199. WPATH, supra note 25, at 67 (noting the WPATH Standards are applicable 
irrespective of housing situations, including for gender-nonconforming people living 
in institutions). 
 200. Levine, supra note 36, at 241. 
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paradigm.201 Furthermore, this argument does not provide any 
reason to deviate from the currently-accepted standards of care for 
the broader, non-incarcerated trans population while we await 
better research.202 Some counter this by arguing that applying these 
same standards may actually be harmful because imprisoned 
persons in particular are not able to satisfy the WPATH criterion 
requiring twelve months of living as the desired gender outside of 
the artificial world of the penal institution.203 As the argument goes, 
incarcerated persons are not in their “real life.” Yet the regrettably 
disproportionate rate of trans individuals who face incarceration 
makes this argument less weight-bearing; for too many transgender 
Americans, prison is real life.204 
Finally, some who admit binary sex does not reflect reality will 
argue that fundamentally remaking the gendered systems and 
spaces of criminal justice is impractically cost prohibitive, even if 
there might be resulting benefits. Recognizing transgender 
imprisoned persons as their identifying gender over their biological 
sex would necessitate “a fundamental reconceptualization of [a] 
societal order” built on the male/female binary.205 The jail or prison 
that acknowledges a transgender person’s trans-gender must decide 
 
 201. See, e.g., Stephanie S. Park & Mitchell H. Grayson, Clinical Research: 
Protection of the “Vulnerable”?, 121 J. ALLERGY CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 1103, 1103–
04 (2008). 
 202. After all, we provide medical treatment to women in the U.S. when, by this 
logic, we should stop treating them for a variety of issues since medical studies have 
used male subjects to such an extent that even common diseases are poorly 
understood for women—for example, heart disease. See Barouch, supra note 160. 
 203. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 774 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting one of the 
reasons Eliason believed the WPATH Standards for GCS were not satisfied was 
“because Edmo had not lived in her identified gender role for 12 months outside of 
prison”); see also Osborne, supra note 10, at 1659 (observing changes in life 
circumstances can affect the severity of GD symptoms and the desirability of GCS, 
potentially leading to post-release regret about having undergone GCS). 
 204. See McCauley, supra note 10, at 34 (noting the high rates of incarceration for 
transgender people); see also Osborne, supra note 10, at 1659 (observing the prison 
environment can be a stabilizing space free from restraining forces of a transgender 
person’s outside relationships, allowing individuals to more freely confront feelings 
of GD, acquire knowledge and language about their experience, and find transgender 
role models). 
 205. Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the “Nascent 
Jurisprudence of Transsexualism”, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 302 (1997) (arguing 
fear of such social upheaval “may be a major factor in the law’s lack of compassion 
for [transgender individuals]”); see also Green, supra note 2, at 72–73 (arguing courts 
find it “difficult to permit the grotesque to mingle with the orderly social body that 
the law attempts to preserve” by recognizing transgender people “as full members of 
society”). 
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how they fit into the existing male/female system or must change 
the system itself.206 
Housing locations, privacy, staffing, searches, safety, and a 
host of other penitentiary protocols are built on the binary sex 
system.207 It is undeniable the forward march of norms in the area 
of gender identity will inevitably create a host of costly challenges 
for our institutions across society.208 Such costs are likely more 
easily quantifiable than the benefits of moving to systems that 
better represent the reality of our genders. While these big picture 
concerns may drive and even be articulated by the Supreme Court, 
such a view strays too far afield from the individually-situated facts 
of a particular incarcerated person who will raise their need for GCS 
in a real case that prompts the review. The settled jurisprudence of 
the Eighth Amendment’s medical necessity doctrine requires a 
“fact-specific analysis” of an incarcerated individual’s symptoms 
and risks of serious harm, available accepted treatments, and 
whether the treatment provided “was the product of sound medical 
 
 206. The American Medical Association recently issued a press release that 
“challenge[d] the status quo of prisons and jails in the United States that house 
transgender prisoners according to their birth or biological sex[,] . . . urg[ing] that 
housing policies be changed to allow transgender prisoners to be placed in 
correctional facilities that are reflective of their affirmed gender status.” Press 
Release, AMA Urges Appropriate Placement of Transgender Prisoners, AM. MED. 
ASS’N (June 11, 2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/ama-
urges-appropriate-placement-transgender-prisoners [https://perma.cc/W9A8-
9YWD]. 
 207. Benish A. Shah, Lost in the Gender Maze: Placement of Transgender Inmates 
in the Prison System, 5 J. RACE, GENDER & ETHNICITY 39, 42–43 (2010) (providing a 
helpful overview of the many existing sex-based prison policies that determine prison 
placements). 
 208. Gender-neutral restrooms are probably the spaces most widely associated 
with gender identity changes in American society today. Jeannie Suk Gersen, Who’s 
Afraid of Gender-Neutral Bathrooms?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 25, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/whos-afraid-of-same-sex-bathrooms 
[https://perma.cc/56KR-Z856] (“One practical reason we can’t change to 
unsegregated bathrooms overnight is that municipal, state, and federal legal codes, 
many with origins in the nineteenth century, mandate that there be separate 
facilities for each sex, in businesses and places of work.”). While the author was 
writing this Note, the University of Minnesota Law School was in hot debate over 
the need for more easily accessible gender-neutral restrooms for its staff and 
students. Disappointingly, the restrictions of state building codes were cited as the 
ultimate basis for taking little remedial action. The Administration noted: 
[W]e learned that we were constrained from pursuing efforts to convert any 
of the building’s multi-stall restrooms into gender-inclusive restrooms by 
current state building code requirements. The state building code mandates 
specific plumbing count requirements that remain gender-specific and also 
control restroom-signage requirements. . . . Should the building code 
change, we will again explore converting our multi-stall restrooms. 
E-mail from Garry Jenkins, Dean, Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., to the Law School 
Community (Jan. 28, 2020, 12:21 PM) (on file with author). 
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judgment, negligence, or deliberate indifference.”209 Thus, to 
counter the inevitable future need to de-gender our institutions 
would require the Supreme Court to whittle the medical necessity 
doctrine away to nothing against its own precedent, which it is 
unlikely to do. There are larger implications for acknowledging the 
rights of transgender persons, but the doctrine of medical necessity 
is too strong and specific to allow for these big-picture fears to 
trump. 
III. Hearing and Seeing What Edmo and Gibson Are Telling 
Us 
This final Part will take a step back to look at the broader 
cultural and legal landscape in which the Edmo and Gibson 
decisions were made. Rooting ourselves in the reality of what Edmo 
and Gibson experienced as incarcerated transgender people—a 
pain-filled reality so acute as to prompt self-injury—demonstrates 
that medical necessity is not effectively actualizing the Eighth 
Amendment. This Part will then explore that dissonance and its 
consequences in American society and the legal profession, 
campaigning for the adoption of proxies that better close the gap 
between constitutional ideals of equality and independence and our 
consciences. 
A. The Mistake of Dismissing Imprisoned Transgender 
People’s Experiences 
At this point, some readers may agree that the Supreme Court 
should probably let this imprisoned subpopulation have their 
surgeries, end of discussion. Actually, the discussion is just 
beginning. Edmo and Gibson are liminal bodies in liminal legal 
spaces, and the liminal spaces are often where we can confront the 
lines we have artificially drawn to see whether or not they reflect 
reality.210 
The problem with dismissing experiences not considered 
“central” in American society is that it gives us cultural myopathy. 
To see ourselves, we need to listen to Edmo and Gibson. America’s 
prison system has demonstrated since its Puritan beginnings that, 
 
 209. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 794 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 210. To say “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to [s]ay what the law is” puts courts in the business of drawing these lines that may 
seem rational, arbitrary, inclusive, or exclusive, depending on where you sit in 
relation to them—and ultimately allows courts to create and reinforce what we 
express and repress in American society. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
177 (1803). 
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in America—contrary to the word of the Declaration of 
Independence—all people are not equal; dependence is preferred for 
norm-transgressors.211 Further, history has shown that what we 
condone as normatively acceptable for our incarcerated members 
tends to become a part of our norms beyond prisons: punishment 
creeps out into our culture.212 We may say our American values are 
equality and independence, but if we foster inequality and 
dependence in our prisons, we foster it in the places we work, the 
schools we and our kids attend, the scientific discoveries we sponsor 
and pursue, and the art that frames our understanding of life.213 If 
the edges are bleeding, the center will eventually be red too. Edmo 
and Gibson tell us the edges are bleeding. 
B. Proxies for Proxies for Proxies: Remembering What Our 
Doctrines and Laws Signify 
At some point, we need to remember what things stand in for 
to see how our proxies relate to our original intent.214 Are Edmo and 
Gibson telling us medical necessity is an effective proxy for the 
Eighth Amendment? Are they telling us medical necessity itself 
encapsulate proxies that should be recognized in their own right 
under the Eighth Amendment? Are they reminding us what the 
Eighth Amendment itself is a proxy for in American society? 
i. Is Medical Necessity an Effective Proxy for the Eight 
Amendment? 
In Edmo and Gibson, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits used the 
same medical necessity test to come to different answers for 
 
 211. CUSAC, supra note 4, at 51. 
 212. Id. at 73–74, 163 (“Ideas about punishment and punishment practices are 
not static things. Not only do they evolve, they also move laterally through society, 
affecting our popular culture and American homes, religious institutions, and 
schools.”). 
 213. For examinations of this phenomenon in art, see, e.g., CUSAC, supra note 4, 
at 186–87 (observing radio and television have historically been—and are—full of 
“cop shows” such as Law and Order, CSI, Criminal Minds, and more—all including 
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JARVIS, supra note 18 (considering the centrality of punishment in American 
literature, including in The Scarlet Letter and Herman Melville’s works, as well as 
in various films, including The Shawshank Redemption and Dead Man Walking). 
 214. This is not in the originalist sense of a return to dictionary definitions from 
centuries ago or letters between Founding Fathers to reach a regressive outcome 
that resists normative change and typically maintains power for a status quo of 
privileged symbolic and literal bodies. See Bourcicot, supra note 10, at 290 (noting 
the Supreme Court struggled to pin down the meaning of “cruel and unusual” from 
the beginning because these are aspirational concepts that resist being fixed to a 
past moment or meaning). 
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individuals with similar experiences of acute GD. Interestingly, 
where they aligned was in the need to answer why medical necessity 
is effectively working to protect Eighth Amendment obligations, 
labors suggesting that medical necessity alone fails to stand in 
entirely for the Eighth Amendment (and this Note will argue, for 
the American conscience). Both circuits argued medical necessity 
was an effective proxy, but for different reasons—and held up 
strikingly different cultural mirrors for Americans in doing so. 
The Edmo court emphasized longevity and harm prevention. 
Judges McKeown, Gould, and Lasnik noted that the values 
embodied by the Eighth Amendment have been upheld through the 
doctrine of medical necessity for forty years by the Supreme 
Court.215 The suggestion is that stare decisis is confirmation over 
time that we have located a correct proxy for what is cruel and 
unusual. The test is working because it can adapt over time to 
“area[s] of increased social awareness” and our “developing 
understanding” of medical conditions and treatments.216 In addition 
to this, the court located irreparable harm at the center of what the 
Eighth Amendment seeks to prevent. The irreparable harm at stake 
for Edmo was both physiological and constitutional. Physiologically, 
her “severe, ongoing psychological distress and the high risk of self-
castration and suicide she face[d] absent surgery constitute[d] 
irreparable harm.”217 Additionally, deprivation of adequate medical 
care violating the Eighth Amendment “cannot be adequately 
remedied through damages and therefore generally constitute[s] 
irreparable harm.”218 Thus, the Ninth Circuit argues that because 
medical necessity prevents irreparable harms as we understand 
them over long periods of time, the test remains a good proxy for the 
Eighth Amendment. 
The Gibson court focused on usualness and had no qualms 
about suggesting the Eighth Amendment allows for the usual 
cruelties. Judge Ho argued that behind medical necessity—and 
before indifference to it—are those actions or inactions American 
society sets its face against.219 It is not the Fifth Circuit that is cruel; 
it is the American people who are cruel.220 The court argued medical 
necessity is a numbers game to be played, with enough momentum 
from lower and sister courts to creep forward the line until both 
 
 215. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 766 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 216. Id. at 803. 
 217. Id. at 797–98. 
 218. Id. at 798 (quoting Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865, 882 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 219. Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 227 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 220. Id. 
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cruel and unusual are satisfied, as the court argued has occurred in 
the halted practice of executing juveniles.221 The Gibson majority 
made much of the need for consensus, even as it averted its gaze 
from the already existing evidence of medical consensus that would 
sway the Ninth Circuit a few months later. In this way, the Gibson 
court exposed the weakness of the legal doctrine of medical 
necessity as a proxy for what is cruel and unusual: changing norms 
are resisted, especially by society’s institutions.222 To delay the 
demons of change, the Fifth Circuit compelled itself to needlessly 
address the merits of the case.223 The court’s focus on usualness is 
strained by the existing WPATH Standards and the District of 
Idaho’s Edmo decision, so the court belabored the past Kosilek 
decision and resurrected Justice Scalia’s originalist ghost to 
produce its desired outcome: “It cannot be deliberately indifferent 
to deny in Texas what is controversial in every other state.”224 The 
numbers are just not there yet, and the court argued this shows why 
medical necessity is a good proxy for the Eighth Amendment. In 
other words, medical necessity works because, while it allows 
cruelty, it does not allow unjustifiable cruelty. 
Thus, where the Ninth Circuit celebrated medical necessity as 
an effective proxy for keeping imprisoned Americans free from 
irreparable harms, the Fifth Circuit lauded medical necessity for its 
ability to precisely reflect the unvarnished reality of American 
mores. In the Ninth Circuit’s America, we do not forsake protecting 
the fundamental rights of Americans when those lives are 
experienced behind prison bars. In the Fifth Circuit’s America, we 
offer only those protections that minimum decency allows; if you 
lose your liberty, the pursuit of happiness and even life may also be 
withheld.225 If the doctrine of medical necessity can give us two such 
different Americas,226 then there is room to question whether 
medical necessity is the standard-bearing Eighth Amendment 
proxy Justice Blackmun envisioned.227 
 
 221. Id. 
 222. Dolovich observes that the courts themselves have “become sites of 
institutional cruelty.” Supra note 18, at 978. 
 223. Gibson, 920 F.3d at 218, 226–27. 
 224. Id. at 228. 
 225. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 3. 
 226. This Note argues the Fifth Circuit incorrectly applied the doctrine, and 
therefore, it is difficult to make a firm conclusion that medical necessity is or is not 
an effective proxy for the Eighth Amendment based on these two cases. 
 227. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968). 
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ii. Does Medical Necessity Encapsulate Proxies that 
Should be Recognized in Their Own Right? 
If we de-medicalize the symptoms of Edmo and Gibson’s acute 
gender dysphoria, we are left with depression of the desperate 
strain that attempts escape or solution by self-harm and/or 
suicide.228 Our proxies for cruel and unusual punishment, it follows, 
should guard against imposing circumstances that are likely to 
result in higher rates of self-harm and suicidality for incarcerated 
persons.229 These life threats are, themselves, appropriate proxies 
for the Eighth Amendment, wholly apart from medical necessity.230 
If the State is imposing circumstances it knows or should know 
increase the likelihood of self-harm and/or suicidality to statistically 
significant levels, it should be found deliberately indifferent to 
providing appropriately dignified and humane conditions for 
incarcerated persons in violation of the Eighth Amendment.231 
Such a proxy would, for example, make the practice of solitary 
confinement a violation of a person’s Eighth Amendment rights. 
Solitary confinement was first introduced in American prisons 
under the belief that the right conditions for repentance could 
correct the wayward criminal soul.232 It soon became apparent that 
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solitary confinement induced suicide.233 The Supreme Court in 1890 
observed that as a result of solitary confinement:  
 
A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short 
confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was 
next to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently 
insane; others, still, committed suicide; while those who stood 
the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most 
cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any 
subsequent service to the community . . . .234  
 
One hundred years later in the 1990s, the use of solitary 
confinement increased again—despite being previously found cruel 
and ineffective.235 Research conclusions about solitary confinement 
at the turn of this century find “[t]here are few if any forms of 
imprisonment that appear to produce so much psychological trauma 
and in which so many symptoms of psychopathology are 
manifested.”236 Prisons and courts continue to acknowledge these 
known facts.237 Nevertheless, the practice of solitary confinement 
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 237. See, e.g., Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 229 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding prison 
officials were deliberately indifferent to an imprisoned person’s rights when they 
knew of his history of self-harm and suicide attempts and yet still “repeatedly 
subjected [him] to the harsh and unforgiving confines of solitary confinement” even 
though their own prison policy acknowledged “solitary confinement can increase the 
potential for suicide due to the ‘inherent stress’ of those conditions”). 
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continues—as does the need for better proxies for Eighth 
Amendment violations. 
iii. What is the Eighth Amendment a Proxy for in American 
Society? 
The Eighth Amendment and medical necessity are ultimately 
proxies for the American conscience. The society we shape with 
these proxies is a signifier for our moral identity; we make the 
culture we are, and in turn, it makes us. “Humaneness, empathetic 
comprehension of an individual’s suffering, belief in a person’s 
ability to change[,] . . . elections where racial minorities have a 
voice equivalent to their numbers, communal generosity to the 
vulnerable, and, finally, democracy . . .  are all at risk” when we dull 
our consciences to the private pain of our incarcerated fellow human 
beings.238 This is true even if it is not the accepted opinion of our 
political group, religious text, professional association, or lived 
bodily experience.239 
The Eighth Amendment and medical necessity are also proxies 
for the American legal professional’s conscience. Perhaps nowhere 
(other than the minds and bodies of its victims) is the dissonance 
between American conscience and Eighth Amendment proxy felt 
more keenly than in our judges. These individuals are asked to set 
aside their own consciences in favor of proxies that, despite even the 
best intentions, may in fact be cruel. Worse, they must legitimize 
those proxies, “legally transforming the cruelty of institutional 
indifference to prisoners’ suffering into not-cruelty by validating the 
harmful effects of that indifference as consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment.”240 Herein lies a moral rot: We have a toxic legal 
confirmation bias where we insist judges “suppress any instinctive 
sympathy they may have for fellow human beings who have 
experienced gratuitous suffering” to enforce our legal standards and 
to avoid even the appearance of judicial bias—regardless of the cost 
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of the suffering that purchases it.241 When consistent, impartial 
justice requires a dulling of conscience, it is not justice. 
Edmo and Gibson invite a reawakening of the consciences of 
Americans and their legal professionals. “Only the repeated 
experience of hearing persons with genital anatomic GD describe 
their anguish is likely to help others understand the psychological 
reality of this condition and the medical necessity of SRS as a 
treatment for it.”242 Arguably, this must be paired with listening to 
trans voices who feel this anguish, but debate the value of its 
medicalization.243 And above all, this must be done by listening to, 
looking at, and acknowledging the individual pain being 
experienced. If we acknowledge our biases and listen to the 
experiences of Americans across the expanses of sex, race, and 
gender, we will see the effects of punishment produced by—and 
producing—our fable of what it means to be American.244 This 
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bodily pain, trauma, and death must be acknowledged, and we must 
create spaces for these silent centers of unspeakable hurt that we 
do not co-opt for medicine, or law, or science, or any other tool of 
methodology to justify being the content-controlling speaker that 
denies, excludes, contextualizes, or colonizes through narration—
instead of hearing and seeing. Only when we are willing to honestly 
acknowledge just what cruelty we are allowing can we contend with 
the dissonance between our American values of equality and 
independence and what our institutions—including the law—have 
created instead.245 
Conclusion 
America continues to criminalize and punish those whose very 
bodily existence transgresses “hegemonic fables of American 
national identity” through institutionalized forms of racism, 
misogyny, and transphobia.246 Yet ideas of equality and 
independence enshrined in the protections of America’s 
Constitution provide tools to struggle with the resulting 
dissonances. Adree Edmo and Vanessa Lynn Gibson stand at the 
edge of American society as transgender, imprisoned people 
experiencing acute GD, but their legal cases in the Ninth and Fifth 
Circuits speak to the heart of some of the most central normative 
rifts that divide us—in particular here, beliefs and scientific 
evidence about sex and gender. Because of these divides, Edmo’s 
access to Eighth Amendment protections and GCS stands in stark 
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contrast to Gibson’s denial of the same.247 The resulting dissonance 
in the application of an identical doctrine of medical necessity is, in 
part, due to the Fifth Circuit’s misapplication of the doctrine; but 
more importantly, it is due to the conscience-dulling gap between 
medical necessity as a proxy for the Eighth Amendment, and the 
Eighth Amendment itself that stands in for our consciences. 
This Note argues that we need to acknowledge the 
circumstances our criminal justice system creates that cause—or 
fail to stop—profound pain in the minds and bodies of imprisoned 
people. We must also acknowledge that this cruelty is able to slip 
through the medical necessity doctrine’s cracks.248 Prison practices 
known to increase the likelihood of self-injury—such as the denial 
of GCS when it is indicated or the imposition of solitary 
confinement—cannot be allowed to continue based on doctrinal 
technicalities or vague fears. We must return to the Eighth 
Amendment afresh, acknowledging and submitting the mighty 
weight of bias we bring in all its myth-sustaining glory to the higher 
ideals to which we aspire as Americans and world citizens. We must 
actualize the normative changes our new understanding of sex and 
gender identity demand. This begins with a Supreme Court that 
should follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead. It continues with new legal 
proxies that allow imprisoned people, lawyers, judges, and citizens 
to call ignoring unconscionable pain in prisons exactly what it is 
when we can do something about it (and the imprisoned cannot)—
cruel. 
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